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Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts
Publication in the United States Courts
of Appeals
Deborah Jones Merritt 54 Vand. L. Rev. 71 (2001)
James J. Brudney
Nearly four out of every five federal court of appeals
opinions are unpublished. For more than twenty-five years,
judges and scholars have debated the wisdom and fairness of
this body of "secret" law. The debate over unpublished opin-
ions recently intensified when the Eighth Circuit held that the
Constitution requires courts to give these opinions precedential
value. Despite continuing controversy over the role of unpub-
lished opinions in the federal system, limited empirical evi-
dence exists on the nature of those opinions. Working with an
especially complete dataset of labor law opinions and using
multivariate statistical methods, Professors Merritt and Brud-
ney were able to identify numerous factors associated with
publication. Some of those factors, such as a decision to re-
verse the agency, track formal publication rules. Others, such
as the number of judges on the panel who graduated from elite
law schools or the number with expertise in the disputed sub-
ject, are more surprising. Merritt and Brudney also discovered
substantial evidence of partisan disagreement within unpub-
lished opinions, suggesting that those cases are not as routine
as publication rules seem to assume. These empirical findings
should guide constitutional and policy deliberations about the
future of unpublished opinions.
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INTRODUCTION
For more than a quarter century, the United States Courts of
Appeals have maintained two bodies of law. One is published,
widely disseminated, and fully precedential. The other, now encom-
passing nearly 80% of all dispositions on the merits,' is unpub-
lished, erratically distributed, and rarely precedential. 2 What dis-
tinguishes these two sets of cases? Is it possible to predict why
judges publish opinions in some cases while resolving others
through unpublished opinions, memoranda, or judgment orders?
Each court has formal rules governing the publication of
opinions, but those standards fail to account for variations in publi-
cation. Despite substantial overlap among circuit rules, publication
rates differ widely among courts and even among individual judges.
In 1999, the Fourth Circuit published opinions in only 9.9% of cases
disposed of on the merits, while the First Circuit published opinions
in 54.6%.3 Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit pub-
lished 181 majority opinions during a recent two-year period, while
several judges from other circuits published fewer than twenty
majority opinions apiece during the same years.4 Differences in
caseload are unlikely to explain such dramatic variations in publi-
cation rates; judges and circuits seem to differ in the type of cases
they find worthy of publication.
Evaluations of the fairness of limited publication rules di-
verge as markedly as publication rates themselves. Many judges
1. According to figures released by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
the courts of appeals resolved 26,727 cases on the merits during the year ending September 30,
1999. JuDIcIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 49 tbl. S-3 (2000), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbusl999/sO3sep99.pdf
[hereinafter 1999 ANNUAL REPORT]. Only 5,371 of those dispositions generated a signed, pub.
lished opinion; 461 yielded an unsigned published opinion; and nine produced a brief published
statement that did not detail the paners reasoning. Id. Fully 78.1% of the courts' merits disposi-
tions were unpublished. Id. The largest category of these unpublished dispositions (15,528) were
"written, reasoned, unsigned" opinions or memoranda; 3,951 were "written, signed" opinions;
1,290 were "written, unsigned [udgments], without comment'; and 117 were oral. Id. All of theso
figures exclude the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The 78.1% figure reflects a steady
increase in the proportion of unpublished merits dispositions since the late 1970s. See infra notes
16-18 and accompanying text.
2. Judge Wald eloquently summed up the second-class status of cases decided by unpub-
lished disposition: They "will likely receive a few sentences of rationale with maybe a citation or
two; they will be memorialized, if at all, only in computer data banks, rather than in the red,
gold, and black volumes of the Federal Reporter; they cannot be cited as authority for any propo.
sition, rendering them in effect a class of legal 'untouchables.' " Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of
Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1373 (1995).
3. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 49 tbl. S-3.
4. See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PRODS.
157, 200 (1998).
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and scholars laud the rules as preserving judicial energy, coping
creatively with an overwhelming caseload, and reducing the crush
of precedent. 5 Critics, on the other hand, charge that unpublished
opinions reduce judicial accountability, deprive litigants of useful
precedent, and create incentives for strategic behavior by judges.6
Even after twenty-five years, debate remains heated over the role of
unpublished opinions in the federal system.7
That debate has become especially compelling in light of a
recent decision by the Eighth Circuit, holding that Article HI of the
Constitution requires federal courts to give unpublished opinions
precedential weight. 8 The Eighth Circuit's ruling does not forbid the
practice of withholding some opinions from formal publication, 9 but
5. See generally Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. LJ.
177 (1999); Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM. U. L.
REV. 909 (1986); Philip Shuchman & Alan Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit:
Can Judges Select Cases of No Precedential Value'?, 29 EriORY L.J. 195 (1980); Elizabeth M.
Horton, Comment, Selective Publication and the Authority of Precedent in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1691 (1995). Professors Berman and Cooper recently argued
that unpublished opinions play a valuable role in allowing panels to explore the implications of
new legal doctrines before adopting settled rules. See Douglas A. Berman & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, In
Defense of Less Precedential Opinions: A Reply to Chief Judge Martin, 60 OHIO ST. W. 2025,
2040-41 (1999).
6. See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or
Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater
Threat?, 44 AM. U. L REV. 757, 785-802 (1995); Pamela Foa, Comment, A Snake in the Path of
the Law: The Seventh Circuit's Non.Publication Rule, 39 U. Prrr. L REV. 309, 338-40 (1977). See
generally Gulati & McCaulif supra note 4; William L Reynolds & William M. Richman, An
Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48
U. CHm. L. REV. 573 (1981) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform]; William L Rey-
nolds & William MI Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-
Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUT. L. REV. 1167 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent]; Kirt Shuldberg, Comment, Digital Influ-
ence: Technology and Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CAL. L. REV.
543 (1997); Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals:
Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 309 (1990).
7. Many state courts also maintain limited publication plans; several scholars have inves-
tigated the scope of those plans. See generally Keith -H. Beyler, Selective Publication Rules: An
Empirical Study, 21 Lay. U. C11. W. 1 (1989) (discussing the empirical study of both state and
federal rules on selective publication); Thomas B. Marvell, State Appellate Court Responses to
Caseload Growth, 72 JUDICATURE 282 (1989) (documenting the growing use of unpublished
opini6ns by state courts).
8. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000). The court noted that Article
III vests only 'judicial Power" in the federal courts, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, and held that
this power necessarily embraces the principle of precedent. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900, 905.
9. Id. at 904 ("The question presented here is not whether opinions ought to be published,
but whether they ought to have precedential effect, whether published or not"). Indeed, the court
noted that "limited publication of judicial decisions was the rule" at the time the Constitution
was ratified. Id. at 903.
Nor did the Eighth Circuit rule that precedents can never be overruled. See id. at 904. On the
contrary, the court confirmed that "[c]ases can be overruled. Sometimes they should be." Id. The
court, however, pointed out that overruling a precedent requires "a burden of justification" with
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it raises profound questions about the place of these opinions in our
jurisprudence. While we do not explore here the constitutional is-
sues raised by the Eighth Circuit, we report empirical results that
provide important background to the debate.
In the past, the elusiveness of unpublished opinions has
hampered empirical investigation of their function. Specialized
services and electronic databases disseminate some unpublished
decisions, but their collections are incomplete. Without a full inven-
tory, it is difficult to explore the differences between unpublished
dispositions and their published counterparts. The Administrative
Office of the United States Courts collects statistics about pub-
lished and unpublished dispositions in the federal courts, but those
numbers conceal important differences among cases and circuits.
For example, one circuit may have a low publication rate because it
handles a large number of social security or habeas corpus appeals,
cases frequently decided without published opinion.
Appeals from decisions of the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") offer a way out of this dilemma. Because the Board
is a party to all such appeals and tracks the progress of each case, it
is possible to obtain a complete listing of appellate decisions dis-
posing of claims arising under the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"). 10 Moreover, decisions reviewing Board adjudications are
both numerous and doctrinally coherent, enabling scholars to probe
in some depth the differences in publication rates among circuits
and judges.
We have compiled a database encompassing all appellate
cases decided between October 1986 and November 1993 that re-
solve unfair labor practice claims under the NLRA.ll As we discuss
more fully below, a rich array of variables distinguishes published
from unpublished opinions in our dataset. Some of these, such as a
decision to reverse the agency, track formal publication rules. Oth-
ers, such as the number of judges on a panel who graduated from
elite law schools or the number of panel judges with experience rep-
the "reasons for rejecting [the precedent] . . . made convincingly clear." Id. at 905. Within the
Eighth Circuit, moreover, only the en banc court may overrule a panel decision. Id. at 904.
10. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
11. The database derives from one we analyzed in James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni, &
Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background
Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIo ST. L.J. 1675 (1999). That article includes a more exten-
sive discussion both of how we built the database and of the variables it contains. As explained
fuither below, we reorganized the database for the current study so that we could analyze by
case (the appropriate unit for publication decisions) rather than by individual judges' votes on
particular issues.
[Vol. 54:1:71
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resenting management clients in NLRA matters, suggest depar-
tures from the rules. We also discovered substantial evidence of
partisan disagreement among unpublished opinions, suggesting
that those cases are not as uncontroversial as publication rules pre-
sume them to be. Understanding these diverse effects is crucial for
litigants dependent upon appellate precedents, for policymakers
concerned about the impact of limited publication rules, and for le-
gal academics and social scientists who rely upon databases of pub-
lished opinions to track judicial behavior.
In the first part of this Article, we briefly describe the evolu-
tion of limited publication plans in the United States Courts of Ap-
peals. In Part II, we describe our database and the variables we
constructed. Part III explores the variables distinguishing pub-
lished from unpublished opinions, as well as indicia of controversy
among unpublished decisions. The final section of the Article dis-
cusses the implications of these findings for lawyers, policymakers,
judges, legal academics, and social scientists. In particular, we note
that some of our empirical findings lend support to the Eighth Cir-
cuit's conclusion that the Constitution requires Article III courts to
accord all of their decisions precedential value.
I. LIMITED PUBLICATION IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
In 1964, the Judicial Conference of the United States re-
solved that the courts of appeals should publish "only those opin-
ions which are of general precedential value."12 The courts re-
sponded to this mandate slowly; until the mid-1970s, courts of ap-
peals continued to publish a substantial majority of their opinions. 13
In 1972, however, the Conference fortified its mandate by requiring
each circuit to develop a publication plan.14 By 1974, each of the
12. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES:
1964 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 11 (1965). The resolution also applied to district courts, but we focus exclusively on the
courts of appeals in this Article. For helpful discussions of the evolution of limited publication
rules, see Dragich, supra note 6, at 760-64; Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform, supra note 6,
at 577-79; Songer, supra note 6, at 307-08.
13. See, e.g., Leonard L Garth, Views from the Federal Bench: Past, Present & Future, 47
RUTGERS L. REv. 1361, 1364 (1995) (recalling that the Third Circuit published opinions in all
cases through the early 1970s); Songer, supra note 6, at 308 (suggesting that the percentage of
unpublished opinions did not begin to escalate sharply in most circuits until the mid-19703, and
was still as low as 33.6% in the Eighth Circuit in 1984).
14. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES.
1972 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 33 (1973).
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circuits had complied with this request and the Conference had ap-
proved their plans. 15 The number of unpublished opinions "esca-
late[d] sharply" after that time.'6 By 1978-79, half of federal appel-
late dispositions were unpublished;17 the figure reached two-thirds
by 1989.18 Today, almost 80% of the courts' merits dispositions are
unpublished.19
Each circuit maintains formal rules governing the publica-
tion of opinions. The rules attempt to limit publication to decisions
that "add to the body of law" and "have value as precedent."20 Be-
15. See Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform, supra note 6, at 578-79; Songer, supra noto 6,
at 308.
16. Songer, supra note 6, at 308. As other scholars have recognized, the phrase "unpub-
lished opinions" is somewhat euphemistic. See, e.g., Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform, supra
note 6, at 585. The category includes orders, judgments, and memoranda, many containing littlo
judicial reasoning. It might be more accurate to refer to these cases as "unpublished disposi-
tions." The cases, however, all represent judicial dispositions on the merits after oral argument
and/or submission of formal briefs. See infra note 17. They are "unpublished opinions" in the
sense that they are unpublished dispositions that might have produced published opinions. We
thus follow the convention of other scholars in referring to these dispositions as "unpublished
opinions." See, e.g., Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform, supra note 6, at 585 & n.40.
17. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 344-46 tbl. B-1 (1980) [hereinafter 1979 ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting 9,361 cases
disposed of after oral argument or submission on the briefs); Reynolds & Richman, Price of Re-
form, supra note 6, at 584 & n.39, 586 (reporting that 4,699 out of 12,419 opinions were pub-
lished for the year ending June 30, 1979). The 4,699 published opinions comprised 50.2% of the
9,361 merits dispositions.
Reynolds and Richman estimated that as many as 61.7% of all dispositions were unpublished
in 1978-79, Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform, supra note 6, at 587, but they included all
"appeals terminated 'by judicial action'" in those calculations. Id. at 585 n.45. That larger uni-
verse includes cases resolved without formal briefs or oral argument, including "motions for
summary affirmance, motions for stays, and motions for bail reductions." Id. at 586 n.45. One
could dicker over the set of dispositions that might produce published opinions, but we prefer the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts' more conservative definition of "cases disposed of after
hearing or submission," 1979 ANNUAL REPORT, supra, and use that definition to calculate the
percentage of published opinions throughout this Article. In more recent years, the courts have
referred to that category as "cases terminated on the merits after oral hearings or submission on
briefs." 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, 49 tbl. S-3. In any event, it bears noting that our
estimate of the percentage of unpublished opinions is conservative. If we adopted the somewhat
broader universe of cases studied by Reynolds and Richman, the percentage of unpublished
opinions would be even higher.
18. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1989 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 109 tbl. S-5 (1990) (showing that 64.6% of merits dispositions were unpublished).
19. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 49 tbl. S-3.
20. 8TH CIR. R. App. I; see also D.C. CIR. R. 36(a) (stating that the court's policy is to publish
opinions that have "general public interest"); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1 (stating that opinions "that may
in any way interest persons other than the parties to a case should be published"). Throughout
this section, we cite the circuit rules in effect in 1993, the end of the seven-year period we stud-
ied. Most circuits have not changed those rules substantially since 1993. But see supra notes 8-9
and accompanying text (noting Eighth Circuit's recent decision striking its rule governing lim-
[Vol. 54:1:71
2001] STALKING SECRET LAW
yond that core objective, the rules display considerable variety in
their details. During the time period we studied, six circuits en-
couraged or required publication of decisions reversing the lower
court or agency, while the other six were silent on this issue. 21 Four
circuits favored publication of decisions including a dissent or con-
currence, but the other eight omitted any mention of this
criterion.22 The rules of four circuits suggested that a single judge
from the deciding panel could force publication of an opinion;2 four
ited citation and precedential effect of unpublished opinions). Eleven of the twelve circuits,
moreover, maintained the same publication rules in all relevant respects during the full seven
years we studied. For the Tenth Circuit, the only circuit that changed relevant rules between
1986 and 1993, we discuss both versions of the rules. See infra notes 28, 31, and accompanying
text.
21. Courts were especially likely to require, rather than encourage, publication if the ap-
pellate decision reversed a published opinion. See D.C. Cm. R. 14(b) (1993) ("An opinion, memo-
randum, or other statement explaining the basis for this Court's action .. shall be published if
... it reverses a published agency or district court decision."); 5TH CR. R. 47.5.1 (1993) (CAn
opinion may also be published if it... reverses the decision below."); 6TH Cm. R. 24(a) (1993)
('The following criteria shall be considered by panels in determining whether decisions will be
designated for publication... whether it reverses the decision below."); 7TH CmL. R. 53(c)(1)(v)
(1993) (A published opinion will be filed when the decision ... reverses a judgment or denies
enforcement of an order when the lower court or agency has published an opinion supporting the
judgment or order."); 8TH Cim. R. App. 11 (1993) CAn opinion should be published when the case
or opinion... does not accept the rationale of a previously published opinion in that case."). The
Ninth Circuit's rules seem to favor publication of cases reversing published dispositions by impli-
cation. The rules provide for opinion status (and thus publication under that court's nomencla-
ture) if the appellate decision disposes "of a case in which there is a published opinion by a lower
court or administrative agency, unless the panel determines that publication is unnecessary for
clarifying the panel's disposition of the case. 9TH CIR. R. 36-2 (1993). Presumably reversals
would require that clarification, because the agency's or lower court's rationale would not sup-
port the result
22. See lST Cm. R. 36.2(b)(3) (1993) ('When a panel decides a case with a dissent, or with
more than one opinion, the opinion or opinions shall be published unless all the participating
judges decide against publication."); 2D CIR. R. 0.23 (1993) (authorizing summary disposition
with unpublished memoranda only "in those cases in which decision is unanimous); 5TH CL R.
47.5.1 (1993) ("An opinion may also be published if it.. .is accompanied by a concurring or dis-
senting opinion."); 9TH Cm. R. 36-2(f) (1993) (A written, reasoned disposition shall be designated
as an OPINION [and published under Rule 36-1] ... if it... rils accompanied by a separate
concurring or dissenting expression, and the author of such separate expression requests publi-
cation of the disposition of the Court and the separate expression.").
23. See lsr CimL R. 36.2(b)(2) (1993) ("With respect to cases decided by a unanimous opinion
with a single opinion... [a]fter an exchange of views, should any judge remain of the view that
the opinion should be published, it shall be."); id. 36.2(b)(3) (1993) (any case generating more
than one opinion "shall be published unless all the participating judges decide against publica-
tion"); 2D CIR. R. 0.23 (1993) (authorizing summary disposition without published opinion only if
"each judge of the panel believes that no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written
opinion"); 5TH Cm. R. 47.5.2 (1993) ("An opinion shall be published unless each member of the
panel deciding the case determines that its publication is neither required nor justified under the
criteria for publication."). The Eighth Circuit's rule was not quite as firm as these others but
appeared to give individual judges the power to force publication as long as they had authored
some opinion in the case. 8TH CI. R. App. 1 (1993) ("The Court or a panel will determine which
of its opinions are to be published, except that a judge may make any of his opinions available for
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others explicitly required a majority to publish a disposition;24 and
the final four did not discuss this issue.25 Nine circuits enumerated
criteria for making the publication decision beyond the ones already
mentioned here, 26 while two omitted any additional criteria.27 The
Tenth Circuit enumerated additional criteria during the first part
of the period we studied, but dropped those criteria after January 1,
1989.28
Perhaps the most marked formal difference among the cir-
cuits lay in their rules governing citation of unpublished opinions.
Throughout the period we studied, six of the circuits prohibited ci-
tation of unpublished dispositions except to establish res judicata,
law of the case, or similar points. 29 Four other circuits permitted
publication."). We thus counted the Eighth Circuit among courts giving an individual judge the
power to force publication. The Fourth Circuit, in contrast, gave an individual judge the power
to force publication only if that judge had authored the primary opinion in the case and the case
had been "formally briefed and presented at oral argument." 4TH CIR. R. 36.3 (1993). We viewed
this rule as too restrictive to give an individual judge power to force publication in a substantial
number of cases.
24. See 3D CIR. I.O.P. ch. V(F)(3) (1993) C'the determination is made by a majority of the
panel"); 6TH CIR. R. 24(b) (1993) C'opinions shall be designated for publication unless a majority
of the panel deciding the case determines otherwise"); 7TH CIR. R. 53(d)(1) (1993) ('The detormi.
nation to dispose of an appeal by unpublished order shall be made by a majority of the panel
rendering the decision."); 9TH CIR. R. 36-5 (1993) C'An order may be specially designated for
publication by a majority of the judges acting.").
25. But see supra note 23 (describing the Fourth Circuit's limited rule with respect to cases
formally briefed and presented at oral argument).
26. Typical criteria included those listed by the Seventh Circuit, which required publication
of any decision that
(i) establishes a new, or changes an existing rule of law; (ii) involves an issue of
continuing public interest; (iii) criticizes or questions existing law; (iv) consti-
tutes a significant and non-duplicative contribution to legal literature (A) by a
historical review of law, (B) by describing legislative history, or (C) by resolving
or creating a conflict in the law; . . .or (vi) is pursuant to an order of remand
from the Supreme Court and is not rendered merely in ministerial obedience to
specific directions of that Court.
7TH CIR. R. 53(c) (1993).
27. The Second Circuit provided simply for nonpublication in "those cases in which decision
is unanimous and each judge of the panel believes that no jurisprudential purpose would be
served by a written opinion." 2D CIR. R. 0.23 (1993). The Eleventh Circuit similarly declared that
"[o]pinions that the panel believes to have no precedential value are not published." 11TH CIR. R.
36-1 I.O.P. (1993). The rule also exhorted members of the court "to exercise imaginative and
innovative resourcefulness in fashioning new methods to increase judicial efficiency and reduce
the volume of published opinions.' Id.
28. Compare 10TH CIR. R. 17 (as amended Mar. 14, 1979), with 10TH CIR. R. 36 (effective
Jan. 1, 1989). The Tenth Circuit was the only court that changed its pubjication rules in any
relevant respect during the seven years we studied. See also infra note 31 (describing Tenth
Circuit's change in rules governing citation of unpublished opinions).
29. See 1ST CIR. R. 36.1 (1993); 2D CIR. R. 0.23 (1993); 7TH CR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv) (1993); 8TH
CIR. R. App. 11 (1993); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3; D.C. CIR. R. 11(c) (1993). The Eighth Circuit recently
struck down the successor to its citation rule, holding that Article III of the Constitution requires
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citation of unpublished opinions, although their rules attempted to
discourage that practice.30 The Tenth Circuit vacillated, allowing
citation during the initial years of our study, but prohibiting cita-
tion after January 1, 1989.31 The Third Circuit had no rule govern-
ing citation of unpublished dispositions during the years we stud-
ied, but circuit practice regarded these dispositions as lacking
precedential value.3 2
Behind these formal rules stands a thicket of circuit prac-
tices that may affect publication rates. Many circuits use staff
clerks to prepare memoranda disposing of certain cases; those
memoranda are less likely to be published than opinions prepared
in a judge's chambers.33 Staff in many circuits also screen cases for
oral argument, exerting substantial influence over which cases ul-
timately generate published opinions.34 All of these practices, as
well as the preferences of individual judges, may affect the selection
of opinions for publication. Using the database described in the next
section, we attempt to discern the factors most likely to predict that
outcome.
II. THE DATABASE
The courts of appeals adjudicated 1,224 decisions involving
unfair labor practice ("ULP") claims under the NLRA between Oc-
all judicial decisions to carry precedential weight. Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th
Cir. 2000). The limited citation rule was in effect during the period we studied.
30. See 4TH CI. R. 36.5 (1993) (=disfavored"); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3 (1993) ('should normally be
cited" only to establish law of the case or for related purposes); 6TH CIR. It 24(c) (1993) (Cdisfa-
vored"); 11TH CR. t 36-1 LO.P. (1993) ("looked upon with disfavor").
31. Compare 10TH C. t. 17(c) (as amended Mar. 14, 1979) ('Unpublished opinions, al-
though unreported, can nevertheless be cited, if relevant, in proceedings before this or any other
court"), with 10TH Cm. R. 36.3 (effective Jan. 1, 1989) ('Unpublished opinions and orders and
judgments of this court have no precedential value and shall not be cited, or used by any court
within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case,
res judicata, or collateral estoppeL"). In November 1993, the Tenth Circuit changed once again,
suspending its no-citation rule as of January 1, 1994, and allowing citation of unpublished dispo-
sitions for their "persuasive value." Tenth Circuit General Order (Nov. 29, 1993). That change,
however, occurred after the period we studied.
32. See Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 6, at 1180-81. The
court later incorporated a formal reference in its internal operating procedures, noting that-
"[b]ecause the court historically has not regarded unpublished opinions as precedents that bind
the court, the court by tradition does not cite to its unpublished opinions as authority." 3D CUc.
LO.P. 5.8. The reference, however, still stopped short of prohibiting citations by counsel
33. See Stephen Breyer, The Donahue Lecture Series: Administering Justice in the First Cir-
cuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 33, 43 (1990); Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform, supra note
6, at 624-25.
34. See William U. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Cer-
tiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L REV. 273, 290-92 (1996).
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tober 28, 1986 and November 2, 1993. Those cases include three
major categories of claims: allegations that an employer engaged in
an unfair labor practice under section 8(a); charges that a union
committed an unfair labor practice under section 8(b); and disputes
under section 10(c) regarding the nature and scope of relief against
employers found liable for section 8(a) violations.35
We obtained a complete list of these appellate decisions from
the Appellate Division in the National Labor Relations Board's Of-
fice of General Counsel. About one quarter of the appellate deci-
sions (22.9%) reversed, remanded, or modified a Board order; we
coded all 280 of these "reversals" for our database. Of the remaining
944 cases that wholly enforced or affirmed a Board order, we ana-
lyzed a stratified random. sample of 275 decisions.3 6 We then
weighted these sampled affirmances to reflect their presence in the
full population. Our access to the full population of appellate deci-
sions in this field of law is unusual, affording a special opportunity
to analyze publication decisions.
After analysis, we excluded 25 of the reversals because they
involved exclusively procedural, jurisdictional, or constitutional is-
sues that differed substantially from the core ULP issues raised in
the other appeals.3 7 We likewise excluded 17 of the sampled affir-
mances (representing 59 affirmances from the full population) be-
cause they focused exclusively on these same distinctive issues.
Cases that discussed these threshold issues in combination with
ULP claims, however, remained in the database.3 8 Our final data-
35. For further discussion of these categories, see infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
36. Cases were stratified by year. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1695
n.71.
37. Procedural matters included issues such as timeliness or waiver of a claim, as well as a
distinct category of arguments questioning the status of an employer as a successor in the con-
text of a sale, acquisition, or merger. Jurisdictional claims challenged the Board's authority over
certain categories of workers or its compliance with interstate commerce requirements. Most
constitutional claims raised procedural due process issues.
38. Overall, the number of threshold issues remaining in the database was very small.
Twenty-four unweighted cases, representing a total of 67.71 decided cases, raised successor
claims; thirty-two unweighted cases, representing 97.61 decided cases, considered other proce-
dural claims; seventeen unweighted cases, representing 48.20 decided cases, resolved jurisdic-
tional issues; and two unweighted cases, representing 6.90 cases, included constitutional claims.
As explained further below, we controlled for the presence of the first three of these threshold
issues when analyzing publication rates for ULP claims. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying
text.
In addition to the procedural, jurisdictional, and constitutional issues noted above, we ex.
cluded a handful of cases involving two groups of unusual ULP issues: cases questioning "the
scope and content of relief against a union" (rather than against the employer) and cases in
"which employees prevailed against both an employer and a union." Brudney, Schiavoni, & Mer-
ritt, supra note 11, at 1696 n.77. These cases were few in number and differed materially from
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base included 255 reversals and 258 weighted affirmances, repre-
senting a total of 1,140 decisions reviewing ULP claims during a
seven-year period.3 9
The dependent variable for most of the analyses in this Arti-
cle denotes whether the case yielded a published opinion in the
Federal Reporter. We coded opinions excluded from the Federal Re-
porter as "unpublished," even if their text appeared in an electronic
database or specialized reporter.40 The current analyses thus focus
on differences between cases the circuits designate for formal publi-
cation and all other cases. Although our study concentrates on ULP
decisions, there is little reason to believe that courts use dramati-
cally different criteria to make publication decisions in other areas
of law. Publication rates and criteria may vary somewhat among
legal fields, but published ULP cases possess no features that would
make them outliers compared to other cases.
For each case, we also coded more than two dozen independ-
ent variables. Six of those variables describe basic features of the
case: the circuit deciding the appeal; the number of issues resolved;
presence of a dissent; presence of a concurrence; whether the court
reversed the Board on any issue;41 and whether the court's decision
favored the union.4
the ULP cases we analyze here. In contrast to the procedural, jurisdictional, and constitutional
issues, none of the cases retained in our.database included these unusual ULP claims as adjunct
issues.
39. Although we round off the number of decisions in text, decision totals are not round
numbers because of the manner in which we weighted sampled affirmances. The 258 sampled
affirmances actually represent 884.76 affirmed decisions for a total of 1,139.76 "decisions" in the
database.
40. The circuits vary widely in the extent to which they make unpublished opinions avail-
able electronically. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act. A Windfall for Defen-
dants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 99, 104-05 (1999). Three circuits withhold their unpublished
opinions from all electronic databases; the others distribute unpublished opinions through
Westlaw, Lexis, Public Access to Court Electronic Records (CPACER"), or their own, vebsites. Id.
at 104 n.30. Lexis and Westlaw download opinions from the latter two sources. Whether they
receive unpublished opinions directly from the courts or from these other sources, I.exis and
Vestlaw include only some unpublished dispositions in their databases. See id.
41. Because we hypothesized that any reversal might favor publication, we coded a case as
"reversed" as long as the court reversed, remanded, or vacated a Board judgment on any issue.
Cases in which some issues were affirmed and others reversed, therefore, appear in our database
as reversals.
42. We coded a case as favoring the union only if the court disposed of all issues in the un-
ion's favor. A substantial majority of appellate cases resolving ULP claims (69.1935) entirely
favor the union. See also Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1714 tbl. I (reporting
that 76% of all judicial votes on distinct issues in ULP cases favor the union). WYe therefore hy-
pothesized that any departure from the pro-union norm, even involving a single issue, might
favor publication.
Pro-union outcomes in the courts of appeals largely reflect the nature of cases appealed to
those courts from the National Labor Relations Board. During the period we studied, 88% of the
2001]
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Seven other variables reflect characteristics of the circuit in
which the case was decided. One of these circuit variables desig-
nates the total number of ULP cases resolved by the circuit during
the years we studied. A second indicates whether the circuit al-
lowed citation of unpublished opinions during the period we ana-
lyzed.43 A third variable marks circuits that encouraged publication
of reversals, while a fourth distinguishes circuits that favored pub-
lication of opinions including a concurrence or dissent.44 The fifth
variable denotes circuits that allowed a single judge on the panel to
force publication of an opinion, and a sixth designates circuits that
explicitly required a majority of the panel to agree to publication. 45
A final circuit variable indicates whether the circuit rules an-
nounced specific criteria for publication other than references to
reversals or split opinions. 46
Six other variables identify cases in which distinctive types
of issues were resolved on appeal. One variable notes the presence
of a claim arising under section 8(a)(5) of the Act; those claims al-
lege an employer's failure to bargain in good faith with a recognized
union.47 Another distinguishes claims arising under section 8(b) of
the Act; those claims target ULPs by unions rather than
issues appealed to the courts had been resolved in favor of the union by the Board. Brudnoy,
Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1714 tbl. I. That figure, of course, does not reflect the full
universe of cases brought under the NLRA: over 90% of such disputes are dismissed, withdrawn,
or settled before a case is tried or appealed to the Board. See William N. Cooke et al., The De.
terminants of NLRB Decision-Making Revisited, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 237, 238-39 (1995)
(stating that the Board decided only about 2.5% of all ULP cases closed in fiscal year 1990); 55
NLRB ANN. REP. 157 (1990) (showing that, out of more than 32,000 unfair labor practice cases
closed in fiscal year 1990, fewer than 1,100 reached stage of a Board order); 54 NLRA ANN. REP.
211 (1989) (showing that, in fiscal year 1989, fewer than 1,100 of nearly 30,000 closed cases
reached the stage of a Board order).
43. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing variation in citation practices).
We counted the Third Circuit among the courts allowing citation, because it never prohibited
that practice. See supra note 32. The Tenth Circuit changed its citation rule during the years we
studied; we coded Tenth Circuit cases according to the prevailing rule at the time they were
decided.
44. See supra notes 21-22 (describing circuit variation on these publication criteria).
45. As noted above, four circuits did not address the number of judges needed to publish an
opinion. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Those four circuits formed the reference
category for the two dummy variables described above.
46. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994). These claims include some "technical" violations of section
8(a)(5) in which the employer sought to challenge the Board's certification of the union based on
either the scope of the bargaining unit or alleged union misconduct during the election campaign.
Because the Board's certification of election results under section 9(c) is not a final order, em-
ployers who wish to test the validity of a certification typically do so by refusing to bargain with
the union. This produces a violation of section 8(a)(5) that is appealable to the courts.
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employers. 48 A third variable denotes remedial issues raised under
section 10(c) of the Act.49 Three other variables designate threshold
issues resolved in conjunction with ULP claims.5 0 One of these rep-
resents arguments over whether an employer qualified as a "suc-
cessor" to another employer under the Act; a second designates pro-
cedural issues such as waiver or the timeliness of claims; and the
third marks challenges to the Board's substantive jurisdiction, in-
cluding claims that the Board failed to demonstrate a sufficient
connection with interstate commerce or that it attempted to exert
authority over exempt categories of employees. 5'
These six "issue" variables were not mutually exclusive; a
case raising both a threshold procedural issue and a section 8(a)(5)
claim received positive codes for both of these variables. We defined
all of these categories in contrast to the most common category of
issues in ULP cases: claims arising under sections 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3)
of the Act.52 Those sections focus primarily on employees' right to
organize in order to achieve union representation; they constitute
almost half (44.87%) of issues adjudicated by the courts of appeals
in ULP cases. 53 The reference category for all six of our issue vari-
ables, in other words, is cases adjudicating only section 8(a)(1) or
8(a)(3) claims. 54
In addition to variables describing basic features of each
case, the circuit in which it arose and the issues adjudicated, we
48. Id. § 158(b). Ade minimis number of claims against unions were filed under section 8(e)
of the Act. See id. § 158(e). We combined the latter claims with the analogous, and much more
numerous, section 8(b) claims for the analyses in this Article.
49. Id. § 160(c) (authorizing the Board to issue cease and desist orders, as well as orders to
take affirmative action including reinstatement of employees and back pay awards).
50. As noted above, we excluded cases in which the only issues decided by the courts of ap-
peals were threshold ones. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
51. We considered one other threshold issue, constitutional claims. Only tvwo cases in our
database, however, included these claims, so we did not create a variable distinguishing such
claims.
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1994). Section 8(a)(1) claims allege employer interference
with employee attempts to secure union representation, generally through threats, interroga-
tions, or improper conferral of benefits. Section 8(a)(3) claims allege employer discrimination
against union members or supporters, typically arising out of terminations, layoffs, or failures to
recall or rehire. In a small number of cases, unions or employees charged employer misconduct
under section 8(f). Id. § 158(f). We grouped those claims with analogous section 8(a) claims for
the analyses in this Article.
53. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1707, 1714 tbl. I.
54. A small number of cases included claims arising under subsections of 8(a) other than
the ones described in text. These included claims of employer domination of labor organizations
arising under section 8(a)(2) and alleged retaliation for filing a charge with the NLRB, brought
under section 8(a)(4). In preliminary analyses, we distinguished these claims from other section
8(a) claims, but found no significant effects. The analyses reported here group these miscellane-
ous section 8(a) claims with the section 8(a)(1) and (3) claims.
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created nine variables describing characteristics of the judges de-
ciding each case. Five of these variables indicate the number of
judges on each panel who (1) were appointed by a Democratic
President; 55 (2) were female; (3) graduated from an elite law
school;56 (4) had experience representing management clients in
NLRA cases; 57 and (5) had exclusively union, government, or aca-
demic (non-management) experience under the NLRA.58 We coded
each of these variables 0, 1, 2, or 3 for each case, representing the
number of judges holding that characteristic on the panel. Three
other variables indicate whether any judges on the panel were (6)
members of a minority race; (7) district court judges sitting by des-
ignation; or (8) court of appeals judges sitting by designation from
another circuit.5 9 A final "judicial characteristic" variable reflects
(9) the average age of the three judges deciding each case. 60
As explained further below, we modified some of these judi-
cial characteristic variables to test specific hypotheses. Our basic
analyses, however, follow the coding scheme outlined above.
55. As in other studies of judicial attitudes, we relied upon the party of the appointing
President as a proxy for the judge's own political inclinations. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Mer-
ritt, supra note 11, at 1689-92, 1702.
56. We used the 1977 Cartter Report to choose fifteen schools for this elite group. See The
Cartter Report on the Leading Schools of Education, Law, and Business, CHANGE, Feb. 1977, at
44, 46; Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1704 n.105. The fifteen schools are Ber-
keley, Chicago, Columbia, Cornell, Duke, Harvard, Michigan, NYU, Northwestern, Pennsylva-
nia, Stanford, Texas, UCLA, Virginia, and Yale. Id.
57. Judges in this category included both those whose exclusive NLRA experience was on
behalf of management and those whose experience included union, government, or academic
work as well as management representation.
58. We excluded from this category judges who combined union, government, or academic
experience involving the NLRA with management experience under that statute. Judges with
such mixed experience were grouped with purely management attorneys in our previous vari-
able. An alternate set of analyses, coding judges with mixed experience positive for both NLRA
variables, did not differ materially from the analyses reported below; the variable for NLRA
management experience was significant, while that for other types of NLRA experience was not.
59. We coded these variables as dichotomies, rather than as ordinal variables stretching
from zero to three, because very few panels included more than one judge falling into any of
these categories. Eight panels included two minority judges; two included two district court
judges; none included more than one appellate judge visiting from another circuit. We did not
distinguish between active and senior judges serving within their own circuit.
60. We measured age at the time of decision. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note
11, at 1702 & n.98. We tested numerous other judicial characteristics in our exploration of pub-
lication rates, but none had significant explanatory power. Tested attributes include religion;
status of college attended; workplace law experience falling outside the NLRA; experience repro-
senting business clients with no exposure to workplace law; pre-judicial service as a full-time
academic; service on a different court before appointment to the court of appeals; pre-judicial
elected office experience; pre-judicial experience in a nonelective government position; and year
of appointment to the court of appeals. See id. at 1702-05 (discussing these tested variables).
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III. RESULTS
In this section, we explore six types of analyses. First, we
look simply at intercircuit variation in citation rates, as well as
some formal characteristics distinguishing the circuits from one
another. Second, we add half a dozen case characteristics (such as
the presence of a dissent or concurrence) to our analyses. Next, we
introduce variables representing judicial characteristics (such as
gender or political background) on each of the deciding panels.
Fourth, we look specifically for any evidence that judges engage in
strategic behavior to publish outcomes with which they agree or to
suppress results that cause them discomfort. Fifth, we consider
whether homogeneous panels-those that share a common gender,
political party, or other trait-are more or less likely to publish
opinions than heterogeneous panels. Finally, we examine whether
unpublished opinions should be viewed as merely routine applica-
tions of the law or whether there is evidence linking those opinions
to certain indicia of controversy.
A. Intercircuit Variation
The circuits vary markedly in the percentage of unfair labor
practice opinions they publish. As Table I shows, the Third Circuit
published just one-quarter of its ULP decisions, while the Seventh
Circuit published nine-tenths of those opinions. These percentages,
like several others, depart dramatically from the nationwide aver-
age of 53.36% published opinions in ULP cases.
2001]
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Table I: Publication Rates by Circuit
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Number of
ULP Opinions
Published
11 Total Number
ULP Opinions
11 Percentage of
ULP Opinions
Published
iPercentage of ]all Opinions
Published
D.C.
1st
2d
3d
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
llth
Nationwide F
IMean I;
81.05
12.94
46.05
27.58
28.69
24.94
90.14
118.67
51.25
80.68
18.23
27.97
50.68
129.38 62.64% 38.58%
19.79 65.39% 62.35%
104.41 44.10% 36.63%
114.33 24.12% 19.28%
70.59 40.64% 15.53%
51.86 48.09% 27.88%
187.40 48.10% 20.45%
129.98 91.30% 51.35%
62.50 82.00% 43.53%
182.08 44.31% 23.08%
38.81 46.97% 34.48%
48.63 57.52% 25.85%
94.98 53.36% 7 33.25%IF
Numbers of opinions are not whole numbers because of weighting.
In every circuit, the percentage of published ULP opinions
exceeded the overall percentage of published opinions.61 Overall
publication rates probably lag behind ULP rates because the former
category includes prisoner appeals, social security claims, and other
routine dispositions that the courts frequently decide without pub-
lished opinion. It is noteworthy, however, that ULP publication
rates correlate highly with overall publication rates (r = .744,
p = .006). Circuits that published a higher percentage of ULP opin-
61. The final column of Table I shows the percentage of all opinions published by each cir.
cuit between July 1, 1989, and September 30, 1993. We calculated these percentages by averag-
ing the annual figures reported in Table S-3 of the 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993 annual reports of
the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. See REPORTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. S-3 (1994);
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: 1992
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS tbl. S-3 (1993); REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1991 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. S-3 (1992); REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. S-3 (1991). Before 1990, the courts
did not calculate percentages of published and unpublished opinions. Scholarly studies, however,
suggest that the percentage of published ULP opinions exceeded the overall percentage of pub-
lished opinions before 1990 as well. Songer, for example, found that the Fourth, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits decided just 28.2% of their cases by published opinion in 1986, the year before our
study began. Songer, supra note 6, at 311. Table I, in contrast, shows that those circuits decided
40.64%, 57.52%, and 62.24% of their ULP appeals with published opinions.
I Circuit
i ................
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ions, in other words, also tended to publish a higher percentage of
decisions overall. This correlation suggests that publication deci-
sions in ULP cases provide reasonable insight into those decisions
in other types of cases.
Our first set of analyses considers whether differences in
formal publication rules or ULP caseload account for any of the
variation in ULP publication rates among circuits. For example,
courts deciding a large volume of ULP cases might publish a lower
fraction of those cases because judges with greater experience adju-
dicating such controversies may perceive the marginal value of ad-
ditional precedents as small.62 Conversely, circuits encouraging
publication of reversals might publish a higher percentage of their
decisions than circuits whose rules do not expressly encourage pub-
i/cation of those dispositions.
Table II reports publication rates for each of the variations
in circuit caseload or rules that we studied.6 The table suggests
that circuits deciding a low volume of ULP cases published a some-
what higher fraction of their decisions than did circuits resolving a
high volume of those cases, but the difference was not statistically
significant in this bivariate analysis.64 Circuits that encouraged
62. See Horton, supra note 5, at 1696. This phenomenon might be especially likely to occur
under a mature statute like the NLRA, appellate cases may be less likely to break new ground
after several generations of precedent from the Supreme Court.
63. For purposes of this table only, we divided circuits into "high volume" circuits (those
that decided more than one hundred ULP cases during the seven years we studied) and "low
volume" circuits (those deciding fewer than one hundred ULP cases during the same period). As
can be seen from Table I, supra, virtually every circuit is either substantially below the one hun-
dred mark or substantially above that level Only the Second Circuit, which decided 104 cases, is
close to our chosen demarcation point. In the multivariate analyses reported below, we use the
actual number of ULP cases decided by each circuit, rather than this dichotomous variable.
64. We follow the common social science convention of designating results with a p-value of
.05 or less as "significant." See DAVID S. MOORE, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 416
(3d ed. 1991). See generally HUBERT M. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS (2d rev. ed. 1979). For
convenience, we separately note results with a p.value of.01 or less. A result that is significant
at the .05 level has no more than a 5% probability of occurring through random error in sampling
or coding, while one that is significant at the .01 level has no more than a 1% probability of oc-
curring through those random processes.
Throughout this Article, we also designate results with a p-value of.10 or less as "approach-
ing significance." Those results have no more than a one-in-ten chance of stemming from ran-
dom errors. Social scientists sometimes treat such results as identifying relationships that are
suggestive or at least warrant further exploration. See MOORE, supra, at 414-20; . MARK
SIMN, STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 195-96 (1995). This is particularly true if the re-
sults form a consistent pattern with other results that approach or achieve significance. Based
on findings in previous studies, we could have reported some of these results as "significant" (i.e.,
reaching the conventional .05 level) under one-tailed tests of significance. We adopted the con-
servative approach, however, of treating none of our hypotheses as directional.
The statistical tests in Table H compare the subcategories within each category (eg., "high-
volume circuit" and "low-volume circuit" for volume of ULP cases) using the Rao and Scott sec-
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publication of reversals, on the other hand, published significantly
more of their decisions than did other circuits. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, circuits that encouraged publication of opinions carrying dis-
sents or concurrences published a significantly lower percentage of
their opinions than did other circuits; we discuss possible reasons
for this effect below.
Table II: Publication Rates by Circuit Characteristics
7Circit Characteristic ... -Pe rcentage-of U-LP- Opinion s ---- 
Published
High-Volume Circuit 52.40%
Low-Volume Circuit 56.14%
Publishing Reversals Encouraged 60.11% *
No Reversal Rule 40.72% ***
Publishing Split Ops Encouraged 45.96% **
No Split Op Rule 56.75% **
One Judge Causes Publication 56.66%
Majority Needed to Publish 51.66%
No Rule 54.26%
Additional Criteria 54.20%
No Additional Criteria 48.93%
Citation of Unpublished Opinions Allowed 41.96% ***
No Citation Allowed 61.75% *
All Cases 53.36%
**p <.05, ***p< .01
Circuits allowing one judge to mandate publication pub-
lished a higher fraction of their dispositions than did circuits that
failed to specify the number of panel members needed to achieve
publication; conversely, circuits requiring a majority consensus for
publication published a smaller percentage of their opinions. Nei-
ther of these differences, however, was statistically significant. Nor
did the publication rate in circuits specifying additional publication
criteria differ significantly from that in circuits that failed to spec-
ify any criteria. Finally, circuits that prohibited citation of their
unpublished opinions published a significantly higher percentage of
their opinions than did circuits permitting citation.
When we combined these circuit variables into a regression
equation, which allowed us to control simultaneously for variations
in case volume and circuit rules, we uncovered several surprises
ond-order correction for weighted data. See 4 STATA REFERENCE MANUAL RELEASE 6, at 82-83
(1999).
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(Table 11I). 65 Rules encouraging publication of reversals still showed
a significant positive association with publication, while rules fa-
voring publication of split decisions continued to show a significant
negative association with that event. Rules allowing citation of un-
published opinions likewise showed a significant negative associa-
tion with publication. Controlling for these and other factors, how-
ever, allowed two other significant relationships to emerge. A case
decided in a circuit resolving a large number of ULP claims was
significantly less likely to be published than one decided in a circuit
with fewer ULP cases. Cases resolved in circuits requiring a major-
ity consensus for publication, on the other hand, were significantly
more likely to be published than cases decided in circuits neglecting
to specify the number of judges needed for publication.66
Table III: Logistic Regression for Publication: Circuit Rules and ULP Caseload
(N=1139.76)
I Variable Coefficient Robust Std.E-trror - Snificano
Total ULP Opinions - .0124 *** .0045 .005
Reversal Rule 1.4411 *** .3823 .000
Split Opinion Rule - 1.0117 * .3412 .003
One Judge for Publication .4038 .4739 .394
Majority for Publication .8150 ** .3967 .040
Additional Criteria - .6855 .4640 .140
Citation Allowed - .9181 ** .2658 .001
Constant 1.5483 * .5769 .007
Pseudo R2 .0918*** .000
** p : .05, *** p _ .01
These significant associations do not necessarily imply cau-
sation. Formal rules encouraging publication of reversals, for ex-
ample, may not cause circuits to publish a higher percentage of
their opinions. Instead, circuits with a culture favoring publication
may be more likely to adopt rules encouraging the publication of
65. Regression analysis is increasingly common in legal scholarship. The technique allows
scholars to examine the relationship between an independent variable (such as the number of
ULP cases decided by a circuit) and an outcome (the likelihood that an opinion will be pub-
lished), while controlling for all other variables in the equation. All of our regression analyses
employ logistic regression because our dependent variable (publication) is dichotomous. For
further discussion of regression equations, see JOHN H. ALDRICH & FORRESr D. NELSON, LINEAR
PROBABILITY, LOGIT, AND PROBMT MODELS 9-35 (1984); JANET BUTTOLPH JOHNSON & RICHARD A.
JOSLYN, POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS 389-401 (3d ed. 1995); SIRKIN, supra note 64,
at 446-67 (1995). We used Stata Release 6.0 for all regression analyses in this Article. See 2
STATA REFERENCE MANUAL RELEASE 6, at 200-39 (1999).
66. Notably, the coefficient for circuits allowing a single judge to designate an opinion for
publication was also positive, though not significant. The direction of these two coefficients,
however, suggests that specifying the number of judges needed to authorize publication-as
opposed to the particular number chosen-may be associated with higher publication rates.
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reversals. The negative relationship between publication and rules
governing split decisions seems particularly unlikely to be causal.
Why would a rule designed to encourage publication of split deci-
sions discourage publication overall? Instead, circuits adopting this
rule may have a predisposition against publication, choosing this
rule precisely because it favors publication of relatively few deci-
sions.67
Overall, differences in caseload and formal rules explained
9.18% of the variance in publication decisions, suggesting that
these factors either play some role in determining publication or
correlate with more informal practices playing that role. To explore
the role of the latter factors, we created an alternate regression
equation using dummy variables for eleven of the twelve circuits
instead of the circuit-related variables used in Table 111.68 That
equation, reported in Table IV, allows us to capture variation
among the circuits, whether differences stem from formal rules, bu-
reaucratic structures, or informal practices. 69
Table IV: Logistic Regression for Publication: Circuits (N=1139.76)
Variable FCoefficient 7 Robust Std. Error F-Significance ]
D.C. Circuit .5930 .3922 .130
1st Circuit .7121 .8591 .407
2d Circuit - .1609 .4067 .692
3d Circuit -1.0699 ** .4456 .016
4th Circuit - .3027 .4463 .498
5th Circuit - .0004 .4919 .999
7th Circuit 2.4267 * .6057 .000
8th Circuit 1.5924 ** .6273 .011
9th Circuit - .1526 .3578 .670
10th Circuit - .0452 .5944 .939
llth Circuit .3790 .5782 .512
Constant -.0760 .2388 .750
1 Pseudo R 2  H .1119 *** .000
** p< .05, *** p .01
67. Only 7.92% of the cases in our database included a concurrence or dissent. Similarly, in
their database of 1978-79 appeals, Reynolds and Richman found that only 12.4% of published
opinions, and 0.5% of unpublished ones, included separate opinions. Reynolds & Richman, Price
of Reform, supra note 6, at 614. Encouraging publication of nonunanimous cases, therefore, af.
fects a fairly low percentage of decisions.
68. In this substitute equation, we used the Sixth Circuit as the reference category for each
of the other circuits. That circuit both decided the largest number of ULP cases and had a publi-
cation rate near the national mean.
69. Unfortunately, due to collinearity, we could not include the variables from Table III and
the circuit dummies in the same equation.
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The substitute equation in Table IV explains modestly more
of the variance in publication, suggesting that circuit-specific fac-
tors beyond those specified in Table III play some role in publica-
tion rates. The table also confirms that the Third Circuit published
significantly fewer of its ULP opinions than the Sixth Circuit did,
while the Seventh and Eighth Circuits were significantly more
likely to publish their opinions. 70 For our remaining analyses, we
use the circuit-specific variables in Table IV, rather than the ones
in Table III, because they better capture both formal and informal
differences among the circuits.
B. Case Characteristics and Issues
Formal publication rules suggest that characteristics of indi-
vidual cases, such as the presence of a dissent, may help explain
differences in publication rates. The doctrinal issues resolved in an
opinion may also affect publication; some areas of law may generate
decisions with precedential value more readily than other areas.
Table V summarizes publication rates for decisions that resolved
particular IJLP issues or included certain distinguishing features.
The table shows that courts were significantly more likely to pub-
lish cases resolving section 8(b) claims than cases adjudicating sec-
tion 8(a)(1) or (3) issues.71 Courts were also significantly less likely
to publish an opinion discussing a successor issue, one of the three
threshold issues we identified.7 2 On the other hand, courts were
significantly more likely to publish opinions with concurrences or
70. The Third Circuit is notorious for overall low publication rates. See Songer, supra note
6, at 308 (reporting that in 1984, the Third Circuit published only 20.8% of its dispositions);
Gulati & McCauliff supra note 4, 184-86 (discussing prevalence of judgment orders in Third
Circuit).
71. The courts also appeared more likely to publish cases resolving section 8(a)(5) claims,
but this relationship merely approached significance. For explanation of these statutory sections,
see supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the concept of signifi-
cance, see supra note 64. The significance tests reflected in Table V compare the subcategories
within each category. For the first two categories (statutory issues and threshold issues), the
subcategories were not mutually exclusive, so we used regression analysis (omitting one of the
subcategories as a reference) to test for significance. See supra note 65 for further explanation of
that technique. Subcategories in the remaining categories were mutually exclusive; we compared
those categories using the statistical test described in note 64 supra.
72. Although this difference is notable, caution must be exercised in interpreting it--as well
as any other findings related to the threshold issues. We excluded from the database cases rest-
ing exclusively on such issues; we analyze here only the relationship of these threshold issues to
publication of cases that also resolved substantive or remedial ULP claims. To probe publication
rates for jurisdictional or procedural issues fully, one would have to examine a representative
sample of all cases adjudicating those claims. We include these variables in our analyses as con-
trols for our investigation of ULP claims.
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dissents rather than those that were unanimous; to publish rever-
sals rather than affirmances; and to publish decisions rejecting un-
ion claims rather than those favoring the union. We detected no
significant difference between cases resolving multiple issues and
those including a single issue. Nor did we find a significant associa-
tion between the year of decision and the likelihood of publication
(p=.4867). 73
Table V: Publication Rates by Case Characteristics and Issues
I Case Characteristic 1Percentage of ULP Opinions Published ]
8(a)(1) and (3) Issues 48.41%
8(a)(5) Issue 56.40% *
8(b) Issue 66.27% **
10(c) Issue 53.52%
No Threshold Issues 53.88%
Successor Issue 32.70% **
Jurisdictional Issue 58.11%
Procedural Issue 63.68%
Unanimous 50.39% ***
Concurrence 94.08% ***
Dissent 86.56% ***
All Issues Affirmed 44.28% ***
At Least One Issue Reversed 85.04% *
One-Issue Case 50.56%
Multiple Issues 55.81%
Appellate Outcome for Union 44.00%
Appellate Outcome against Union 74.38% *
1 All Cases 53.36%
• p < .10, ** p _ .05, *** p _ .01
We added variables reflecting these case characteristics to
the regression equation reported in Table IV. The results of that
enhanced equation appear in Table VI. The explanatory power of
this equation is more than double that of the equation in Table IV,
suggesting that case characteristics play an important role in de-
termining publication. 74 The equation confirms that opinions re-
versing the Board's decision, as well as those generating a dissent,
are significantly more likely to be published than unanimous affir-
mances, even after controlling for other factors. The coefficient for
73. This result does not fit comfortably in Table V. Publication rates for each year were:
1986, 59.47%; 1987, 57.67%; 1988, 46.43%; 1989, 50.63%; 1990, 61.52%; 1991, 59.34%; 1992,
51.93%; 1993, 43.60%. Although these percentages fluctuated around the overall publication rate
of 53.36%, the pattern was not significant.
74. When we limited the regression equation to the case characteristics added in Table VI,
without including the circuit dummies, the equation explained 15.71% of the variance in publica-
tion decisions--more than all of the circuit variables combined.
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cases including a concurrence is also positive, suggesting an asso-
ciation with publication, but one that does not reach significance.
Notably, after controlling for other variables, the court's out-
come (for or against the union) no longer shows a significant asso-
ciation with publication. The bivariate association between those
variables is due not to the courts' desire to publish cases favoring
employers, but to their tendency to publish reversals combined with
the disproportionate number of appealed Board decisions favoring
the union.75
Table VI: Logistic Regression for Publication: Case Characteristics and Issues
(N=1139.76)
SV±rlhlp_
Reversal
CA For Union
Dissent
Concurrence
8(a)(5) Issue
8(b) Issue
10(c) Issue
Procedural Issue
Successor Issue
Jurisdictional Issue
Multiple Issues
Year of Decision
D.C. Circuit
1st Circuit
2d Circuit
3d Circuit
4th Circuit
5th Circuit
7th Circuit
8th Circuit
9th Circuit
10th Circuit
11th Circuit
Constant
Pseudo R2
C~fi.~nt~ TI 1ohiwt .qd flrvm.
2.5259 *
.2539
2.0398 *
2.0675
.8911 *
1.7709 *
.0409
1.0068 *
-1.2405 *
-. 2727
.1846
-. 0565
.6507
.7745
.1265
-. 7322
-. 6253
-. 1008
2.9928 *
2.0325 *
-. 0009
.4311
.8691
3.3140
.2750***
.4344
.4094
.6399
1.3394
.2800
.5382
.3686
.5338
.7523
.5986
.2845
.0633
.4664
1.0035
.4659
.5380
.6430
.5526
.6950
.7416
.4558
.7094
.6816
5.6938
.000
.535
.001
.123
.001
.001
.912
.059
.099
.649
.516
.372
.163
.440
.786
.174
.331
.855
.000
.006
.998
.543
.202
.561
on
*p _.10, ** 5.05, ***p _ .01
75. Only 13.87% of the cases in our database reviewed a Board decision favoring an em-
ployer; the remaining 86.13% reviewed a decision that had favored the union. Because of this
imbalance, a tendency to publish reversals also favors the publication of appellate decisions
favoring employers. In a regression analysis using appellate pro-union outcome as the only inde-
pendent variable, that variable showed a significant negative association with publication
(p = .000) and explained about 5.93% of the variance in publication. Adding a control for rever-
sals, however, eliminated the significance of the coefficient for appellate outcome (p = .206) and
jumped the equation's explanatory power to 9.47%.
Variable sif-n -1Coefficient 11 Robust Std Errar
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Cases including section 8(a)(5) or section 8(b) issues were
significantly more likely to be published, after controlling for other
variables, than were cases arising purely under section 8(a)(1) and
(3). Remedial issues arising under section 10(c), on the other hand,
showed no significant association with publication. Two of the three
threshold issues showed a possible association with publication
(ones that approached significance at the conventional .05 level),
but these pointed in opposite directions. Cases resolving successor
issues appeared less likely than other cases to be published, while
those adjudicating other procedural issues seemed more likely to
win publication. 76 As in bivariate analyses, neither the resolution of
multiple issues nor the year of decision showed a significant asso-
ciation with publication.
Controlling for the case characteristics reflected in Table VI
eliminated the significant coefficient for cases decided by the Third
Circuit. Although that circuit published a much smaller percentage
of its ULP decisions than did other circuits, case characteristics ap-
pear to explain much of that difference. 77 The Seventh and Eighth
Circuits, on the other hand, published significantly more of their
cases than did the reference Sixth Circuit even after controlling for
characteristics like reversal or presence of a dissent.
C. Panel Characteristics
In the next stage of our analyses, we examined nine different
characteristics of the panels resolving each case: (1) the number of
Democrats on the panel, (2) the number of women, (3) the presence
of a minority judge, (4) the average age of the judges, (5) the pres-
ence of a district court judge, (6) the presence of an appellate judge
from another circuit, (7) the number of judges who graduated from
76. Both of these tendencies appeared in bivariate analyses, see supra Table V, although
only the former was significant there. Most cases (89.1%) adjudicating successor claims also
resolved section 8(a)(5) bargaining disputes. The latter cases, as Table VI reports, were signifi-
cantly more likely than those involving solely section 8(a)(1) or (3) claims to be published. Within
the category of section 8(a)(5) bargaining claims, however, cases raising successor challenges
were significantly less likely than others to be published (p = .004). After controlling for the pres-
ence of a section 8(a)(5) issue, therefore, the negative relationship between successor issues and
publication remained.
77. Further investigation revealed that the Third Circuit was extraordinarily deferential to
the NLRB; that circuit reversed only 7% of the ULP cases it heard, while other circuits reversed
24% of the cases coming before them (p = .0002). Once we controlled for reversals, the Third
Circuit's publication rate did not differ significantly from that of the reference Sixth Circuit. The
Third Circuit, however, remained unusual in its low publication rates. After controlling for sev-
eral additional variables, this coefficient again achieved significance. See infra note 81.
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an elite law school, (8) the number who had NLRA experience rep-
resenting management clients, and (9) the number with other types
of NLRA experience. 78 We added these variables to the regression
equation reflected in Table VI; Table VII reports our results.7 9
The explanatory power of this equation is somewhat higher
than that of the equation reported in Table VI, suggesting that
panel characteristics contribute modestly to publication decisions.80
Only two panel characteristics, however, are significant, with the
coefficient for a third characteristic approaching significance. Pan-
els with more graduates of elite law schools were significantly more
likely to publish their opinions, after controlling for other factors,
than were panels with graduates of less prestigious law schools.
Panels including more judges with pre-judicial experience repre-
senting management clients in NLRA cases, on the other hand,
were significantly less likely to publish their opinions than were
78. As noted above, we tested numerous other judicial characteristics in the equation, but
none achieved significance. See supra note 60. We focus here on the aggregate characteristics of
three-judge panels. In theory, it would be interesting to explore the relationship between publi-
cation decisions and the attributes of the judge authoring each published and unpublished opin-
ion. Unfortunately, however, most unpublished dispositions do not reveal their author;, among
the unpublished dispositions in our database, only twenty-six of the 179 unweighted decisions
identified an individual author. See also 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 49 thl. S-3 (re-
porting that 3,951 unpublished opinions were signed in 1999, while 16,818 unpublished opinions
were unsigned that year). The composite panel effects we explore here, moreover, would hold
even if we were able to control for the identity of each opinion's author. Over time, each judge
sits with every other judge from his or her circuit. In a large database like ours, influences of
authoring judges are thus randomly distributed. Accordingly, we can explore the impact of com-
posite panel characteristics without controlling for the identity of opinion authors.
It might also be worthwhile to explore any relationship between publication and attributes of
the presiding judge on each panel. That judge can be deduced from each judge's year of appoint-
ment and active/senior status. We hope to pursue any such relationships in future research.
Again, however, any effects attributable to the presiding judge on each panel would not under-
mine the composite panel effects we identify here; over time, each judge sits with a variety of
presiding judges within the circuit.
79. This regression equation excludes three sampled affirmances, representing 10.31 cases,
because we could not identify the judges sitting on those panels. With missing values for all of
the panel characteristics on those cases, we excluded them from the analyses in Tables VII, VIII,
and IX_
We are unaware of any other scholars who have attempted to study systematically the rela-
tionship between judicial characteristics and publication. Several scholars, however, have docu-
mented the fact that some individual judges publish significantly more opinions than their col-
leagues. See Gulati & McCauliff supra note 4, at 198-201; Songer, supra note 6, at 312-13; Wald,
supra note 2, at 1376.
80. A regression equation including only panel characteristics, without case characteristics
and circuit dummies, contained no significant coefficients and was not itself significant
(p = .2346). The impact of these panel characteristics, therefore, is considerably more modest
than that of case characteristics or circuit practices. Controlling for the latter variables, moreo-
ver, is necessary to illuminate the role of panel characteristics. Nevertheless, as Table VII shows,
three of these characteristics do play a significant role in predicting publication.
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other panels. Panels with a higher average judicial age seemed
more likely to publish their opinions, but this relationship merely
approached significance.8 '
Table VII: Logistic Regression for Publication: Panel Characteristics (N=1129.45)
!Variable ... -- I Coefficient - 1 Robust Std. Error lV Significance 1
Reversal 2.7073 ** .4872 .000
CA For Union .3832 .4582 .403
Dissent 1.7498 * .6693 .009
Concurrence 1.9509 1.3039 .135
8(a)(5) Issue .9022 * .2983 .002
8(b) Issue 1.9673 *** .6247 .002
10(c) Issue - .0543 .3768 .886
Procedural Issue 1.0055 * .5764 .081
Successor Issue - 1.5255 ** .7415 .040
Jurisdictional Issue - .3504 .5689 .538
Multiple Issues .3957 .3021 .190
Year of Decision - .1194* .0713 .094
Democrats -.2771 .1912 .147
Women .3054 .2868 .287
Minority Judge .0161 .3133 .959
Average Age .0477 * .0281 .089
District Ct Judge .4188 .3530 .235
Visiting Judge .1022 .5885 .862
Elite Law Grads .6939 * .1822 .000
NLRA Mgmt -.6322 ** .2523 .012
Other NLRA .3660 .3414 .284
D.C. Circuit .3205 .5984 .592
1st Circuit 1.0333 1.1815 .382
2d Circuit - .1203 .5155 .815
3d Circuit -1.0322 * .5973 .084
4th Circuit - .3568 .7066 .614
5th Circuit .2718 .5518 .622
7th Circuit 3.5042 *** .7727 .000
8th Circuit 2.9150 *** .7736 .000
9th Circuit .2543 .4665 .586
10th Circuit .5171 .7978 .517
l1th Circuit 1.4373 ** .6975 .039
Constant 4.8610 6.2110 .434
PseudoR 2  " .3182 * - T .000
• p<.10, **p .05, ***p .01
81. Controlling for these panel characteristics also revealed a possible relationship betweon
the year of decision and publication; the likelihood of publication appeared to decline during tho
seven years we studied, although that relationship merely approached significance. Controlling
for panel characteristics also suggested that the Eleventh Circuit was more likely than the Sixth
to publish opinions with similar characteristics. The negative coefficient for the Third Circuit
also approached significance again in this equation.
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Other variables, including the number of women or Demo-
crats on each panel, showed no significant association with publica-
tion in this regression. Our previous research suggested that Re-
publican women resembled Democratic men and women in their
tendency to support the union's legal position in ULP cases, 82 so we
experimented with combining our variables for Democrats and
women into a single variable counting the number of Democrats or
women on each panel. But the coefficient for this variable, like the
separate coefficients for Democrats and women, failed to attain sig-
nificance in the regression equation (p=.312).
Similarly, we combined the variables for presence of a dis-
trict court judge and presence of an appellate judge from another
circuit to create a variable designating the presence of any "foreign"
judge. Once again, however, the coefficient for this combined vari-
able failed to achieve significance in our equation (p=.323). Judicial
attributes affecting publication decisions, at least when we consider
panels as a composite, are limited to graduation from an elite law
school, experience as a management attorney, and age.
D. Strategic Behavior
Some critics of limited publication plans charge that unpub-
lished opinions allow judges to engage in strategic behavior.8 A
judge favoring the union side in NLRA cases, for example, might
publish pro-union decisions while leaving pro-employer opinions
unpublished8 4 Examining the relationship between panel charac-
teristics and overall publication rates, as we did in the previous sec-
tion, might not uncover evidence of this type of behavior.
To probe the possibility that strategic decisions affect publi-
cation, we divided our ULP cases into two groups: those in which
the court of appeals favored the union and those in which the court
82. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1756-59.
83. See, e.g., Gulati & McCaulif supra note 4, at 192-93; Reynolds & Richman, Non-
Precedential Precedent, supra note 6, at 1201. Scholars have also extensively debated the possi-
bility of strategic behavior in judicial voting. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
84. Even judges have noted the possibility of such strategic behavior. Se, e.g., Philip Nich-
ols, Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909. 925 (1986)
(U dissenting myself; I would never so insist [on publication]: it would result in maltng the
decision I objected to precedential instead of nonprecedential, under Rule 18. and I would be
'bound' by it afterwards."); Vald, supra note 2, at 1374 'I have even seen wily would-be dissent-
ers go along with a result they do not like so long as it is not elevated to a precedent. We do occa-
sionally sweep troublesome issues under the rug, although most will no* stay put for long.").
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favored the employer.8 5 We then replicated the regression equation
from Table VII for each subpopulation, omitting the variable for
case outcome. 86 Table VIII compares the results in each subpopula-
tion with our results from the full population.
Table VIII suggests that strategic behavior has little impact
on publication decisions. Political party affiliation, a variable that
has been quite robust in predicting case outcomes in both our work
and other studies of judicial behavior,8 7 was not significant in pre-
dicting publication in any of the three equations. Panels with more
Democrats showed no tendency to publish pro-union results, nor did
they show any inclination to suppress cases rejecting union
claims.88 The variable for gender also failed to achieve significance
in any of our equations, despite previous findings that Republican
women (like Democrats) favor union outcomes on appeal. 89
85. Only a few cases included mixed results. We grouped those cases with pro-employer out-
comes because the modal result in ULP'cases favors unions. See supra note 42. We viewed any
decision in favor of the employer, therefore, as a pro-employer outcome.
86. We also had to omit a few variables from each equation because those variables com-
pletely predicted publication in the subpopulation. For cases decided by the courts of appeals in
favor of the union, all opinions including a concurrence and all cases deciding section 8(b) claims
were published. For cases rejecting union claims, all cases decided by the First, Tenth, and Elev-
enth Circuits were published. We omitted both these variables and the cases reflecting their
characteristics from our analysis of the relevant subpopulation. See 2 STATA REFERENCE
MANUAL RELEASE 6, at 232-34 (1999).
To ease interpretation, Table VIII omits results for the circuit dummy variables. Except as
noted in the previous paragraph, however, we included those dummies in our equations. Full
results are on file with the authors.
87. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1737-41; id. at 1689-92 (collecting
studies).
88. Indeed, the coefficient in our equation for pro-union cases was negative, suggesting that
any tendency among Democrats was a counter-strategic one of publishing fewer pro-union ro-
sults.
89. Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1719-20. As with our main regression
analysis, we also created a variable counting the number of Democrats and women on each
panel. This combined variable, like the separate ones reported in Table VIII, failed to achieve
significance in the regression for either subpopulation.
Three other judicial characteristics displayed a significant association with outcomes in ULP
cases but also failed to show any relationship with publication decisions. Graduates of selective
colleges, as well as judges appointed more recently to the bench, reject union claims significantly
more often than their colleagues, while judges with elected office experience accept those claims
significantly more often. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1715-16 tbls. II &
III. These three variables, however, never showed any significant association with publication
decisions. Indeed, they displayed so little relation to publication that we eliminated them from
the equations reported in this Article.
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Table VIII: Logistic Regression for Publication: Strategic Behavior
VarilPpulation Z Fo uVariable N Coeff£ 'Sic. | Coeff
Reversal
CA For Union
Dissent
Concurrence
8(a)(5) Issue
8(b) Issue
10(c) Issue
Procedural
Issue
Successor Issue
Jurisdict. Issue
Multiple Issues
Year of Decision
Democrats
Women
Minority Judge
Average Age
District Ct
Judge
Visiting Judge
Elite Law Grads
NLRA Mgmt
Other NLRA
Constant
Pseudo R2
2.7073***
.3832
1.7498 *
1.9509
.9022 *
1.9673 *
-. 0543
1.0055 *
-1.5255 **
-. 3504
.3957
-. 1194*
-. 2771
.3054
.0161
.0477 *
.4188
.1022
.6939 *
-. 6322**
.3660
4.8610
1129.45
.3182
.000
.403
.009
.135
.002
.002
.886
.081
.040
.538
.190
.094
.147
.287
.959
.089
.235
.862
.000
.012
.284
.434
.00
2.9645 * .000
2.8555 * .060
1.1211 **.007
.2655 .605
1.1391 .117
-1.3496
.0638
.6312
-. 1656
-. 4195
.5263
.4005
.0917*
.3819
.3592 .674
1.1782"* .000
-. 8643** .012
.2212 .651
5.5915 .531
752.21
.3191"** .002
2.7980 *
1.5250**
.4931
.3411
1.3429
-. 7517
.1864
-1.4275
- .7617
.4118
-. 1273
.1181
.4284
-. 6671
- .0270
.6935
.000
.031
.782
.505
.124
.193
.846
.220
.390
.380
.244
.688
.433
.204
.509
.224
-1.0534 .117
-. 2149 .431
-.2456 .466
.2597 .675
11.4809 .213
331.Q6_
.3011 * 013
# See note 86 and accompanying text
Just three coefficients in Table VIII signal the possibility of
strategic behavior. The coefficients for average age, number of elite
law school graduates, and number of former management attor-
neys-all of which achieved or approached significance in our main
equation-were also significant in the equation for cases favoring
the union. None of these three coefficients, on the other hand, was
significant in the equation for cases rejecting union claims; indeed,
the signs for two of those coefficients are opposite from the signs for
the same coefficients in the other two equations.90 It appears, there-
90. We recognize that the regression for cases rejecting union claims embraces a substan-
tially smaller sample than the regression for cases favoring the union or the regression for all
cases combined. Sample size affects significance calculations, so one cannot simply compare
significance levels across analyses performed in different-sized samples. Sce, eg., PERRY R.
HINTON, STATISTICS EXPLAINED: A GUIDE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDENTS 97-99 (1995) (explain-
ing how an increase in sample size increases the significance of results); IVY LEE & MINAKO
MAYKOVICH, STATISTICS: A TOOL FOR UNDERSTANDING SOCIETY 383 (1995) (Without taking into
account sample size, the same level of significance does not imply the same degree of association.
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fore, that older judges and graduates of elite law schools are more
likely to publish pro-union opinions than their colleagues, but do
not differ from other judges in their tendency to publish cases re-
jecting union claims. Similarly, it seems that judges with NLRA
management experience are less likely than their colleagues to
publish opinions favoring the union, while matching their col-
leagues in their inclination to publish cases rejecting union claims.
Do these publication decisions occur because older judges and elite
law graduates favor unions, while former management attorneys
disdain union claims?
Such an interpretation of Table VIII is plausible, but we find
ample grounds to reject it. To begin with, a strategic interpretation
of Table VIII conflicts with other information about the behavior of
older judges and graduates of elite law schools in ULP cases. When
we analyzed judicial outcomes in all ULP cases, we found no ten-
dency for elite law school graduates to favor the union in their
votes. 91 A strategic interpretation of Table VIII would require the
inference that these judges favor the union in their decisions to
publish, although they do not prefer the union in their decisions on
the merits. Even more tellingly, our analysis of judicial votes re-
vealed that older judges were significantly more likely than their
younger colleagues to reject union claims. 92 A strategic interpreta-
tion of Table VIII, therefore, would force the assumption that older
judges favor employers with their votes but then, somewhat per-
versely, prefer publication of decisions supporting unions.
In addition, nonstrategic preferences readily explain the
publication trends we identified among older judges and graduates
of elite law schools. Older judges are most likely to have graduated
from law school, and begun their legal careers, at a time when the
courts of appeals published a substantial majority of their disposi-
tions. These older judges may attach a higher value to publication
than their younger colleagues; for them, publication itself may seem
more routine. Elite law schools, meanwhile, may breed a special
respect for law as a public institution or for the development of le-
Only when sample sizes are the same does a higher level of significance mean a stronger rela-
tionship."). This concern particularly affects interpretation of the coefficients for judges with
NLRA management experience. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. The contrasting coof.
ficients for elite law graduates and older judges, however, raise at least the possibility of strata.
gic behavior.
91. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1715 tbl. II.
92. See id. at 1754 n.238.
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gal principles through case-by-case decision-making. 93 On a less
flattering note, graduates of these schools also may possess a sense
of self-importance predisposing them to publication9 4 Either of
these factors would produce higher publication rates among panels
that include more graduates of elite institutions.
The composition of ULP cases reaching the courts of appeals,
furthermore, explains why these nonstrategic preferences for publi-
cation manifested themselves most heavily among pro-union affir-
mances. As reported above, the union prevailed before the NLRB in
the overwhelming majority of ULP cases decided by the courts of
appeals.95 All circuits, moreover, published a large fraction of cases
reversing NLRB decisions. 96 Accordingly, judges exercised the most
discretion over publication in pro-union affirmances. Those cases
constituted more than two-thirds (67.09%) of their ULP docket and
were also the most underpublished category. 97 The neutral prefer-
ences for publication we posit among older judges and graduates of
elite law schools would therefore appear as an inclination to publish
pro-union results.
Only in the case of former management attorneys is it possi-
ble to construct a strategic interpretation of Table VIII that is con-
sistent with other information about those judges. Former man-
agement attorneys, somewhat surprisingly, are significantly more
likely than judges with no NLRA experience to vote for union
93. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical
Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE IAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW li, xc-xii, c-ciii (1994)
(reporting that the legal process movement, emphasizing a judicial duty to engage in "reasoned
elaboration" of "principles," was led in the 1950s by Professors Hart, Sacks, and Fuller of Har-
vard Law School, as well as Professor Wechsler at Columbia Law School, and that most elite law
schools either used Hart and Sacks' materials in their courses or developed their own materials
based upon the Hart and Sacks model).
94. Judge Wald's observation about former academics on the bench, that they "may feel ir-
resistibly driven to communicate their intellectual processes and products to the world," could
apply as well to graduates of elite law schools. Wald, supra note 2, at 1372. It is noteworthy,
however, that we found no significant association between experience as a full-time academic
and publication decisions.
95. See supra note 42.
96. Nationwide, the courts published 85.0405 of their reversals in ULP cases. See supra Ta-
ble V. Except for the Fourth Circuit (which published just 57.693S of its ULP reversals), the
Ninth (which published 70.59%), and the Sixth (which published 73.21%), all of the circuits pub-
lished more than 85% of their ULP reversals. Indeed, the First, Second, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits published 100% of those cases.
97. Courts published only 42.64%5 of affirmances favoring the union. In contrast, they pub-
lished 57.97% of affirmances favoring the employer, 84.68% of reversals favoring the union, and
87.88% of reversals favoring the employer.
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claims.98 It is conceivable, however, that those judges prefer not to
publish such results. Their familiarity with the NLRA might incline
them to support pro-union outcomes compelled by that statute,
while their sympathy for management positions might persuade
them to withhold some of those results from publication and its ac-
companying precedential value.
The docket bias described above, however, affects publication
decisions by former management attorneys just as it affects those
decisions by other judges. The ULP cases in which all judges have
the most discretion to withhold or publish opinions are pro-union
affirmances. Any neutral tendency to resist publication would ap-
pear among these pro-union cases, just as any neutral preference
favoring publication would manifest itself there. The significant
tendency of former management attorneys to resist publication of
cases endorsing the union's position, therefore, is as likely to signal
a uniform reticence to publish as one targeted specifically at pro-
union results.
The coefficient for panel members with NLRA management
experience, moreover, is consistently negative in all three equations
reported in Table VIII. This provides persuasive evidence that the
relative reluctance of former management attorneys to publish ULP
cases stems from operation of a neutral preference, rather than
from strategic behavior in pro-union cases. The failure of the nega-
tive coefficient to reach significance in the equation for cases re-
jecting union claims could stem from the much smaller size of that
sample compared with the other samples for which we performed
regression analyses. 99 The lack of statistical significance attached to
that coefficient should not in itself establish strategic behavior.
Finally, as with older judges and graduates of elite law
schools, we can readily identify a nonstrategic reason that might
explain the apparent reluctance of former management attorneys to
publish ULP opinions. Those judges have more experience imple-
menting the NLRA than judges lacking a management
98. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1741.42. We believe this tendency
to favor union legal positions stems from a special familiarity with the increasingly anomalous
tenets of labor law doctrine, a familiarity that breeds respect for the Act's modestly protective
stance toward group action in the workplace. See id. at 1742-50.
99. As Table VIII shows, our primary regression embraced 1129 cases, while our regression
for pro-union cases included 752. In contrast, the regression for cases rejecting union claims was
limited to 332 cases. See also supra note 90 (discussing impact of sample size on significance
levels).
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background. 00 Applying the same circuit rules and guidelines as
colleagues who are less versed in labor law, they may genuinely
view a higher percentage of cases as routine and unworthy of publi-
cation. The negative association between publication and number of
panel members with NLRA management experience, in sum, most
likely stems from expertise rather than strategic conduct.
E. Homogeneous Panels and Whistleblower Effects
Some scholars of judicial politics speculate that homogene-
ous panels behave differently from heterogeneous ones. All-
Democrat or all-Republican panels, for example, may behave differ-
ently from panels combining judges of both political parties. 10 1
Similarly, all-male and all-female panels could differ from panels
including both men and women. If homogeneity matters in judging,
it might play a particular role in making publication decisions. It is
possible, for example, that judges who share similar characteristics,
backgrounds, or attitudes might be more likely to agree that a case
is unworthy of publication because its result is "obvious" than
would judges from different backgrounds who agreed upon the case
outcome but brought different attitudes to that decision. More cyni-
cally, judges who share common backgrounds or traits could tacitly
agree to suppress unpalatable opinions by leaving them unpub-
lished. The presence of a judge who differed in some important re-
spect from the other panel members could serve as a "whistle-
blower," subtly compelling the others to publish an "obvious" or un-
palatable decision. 10 2
100. Although some judges had experience working exclusively for unions, government, or
academia on NLRA matters, and the coefficient for judges with that experience was not signifi-
cant in our analyses, judges with non-management NLRA experience had significantly less
NLRA experience overall than their colleagues with management experience. See Brudney,
Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1746 & n.213.
101. See generally Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedi-
ence to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE IJ. 2155
(1998) [hereinafter Cross & Tiller, Judicial Partisanship]; Richard L. Revesz, Enuironmental
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L REV. 1717 (1997); Richard L. Revesz, Ideol-
ogy, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 VA. L. REV.
805 (1999); Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improuing American
Justice, 99 COLUm L. REV. 215 (1999); Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Reply to
Judge Wald, 99 COLUML L. REV. 262 (1999). For responses by prominent jurists to these asser-
tions, see Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L
REV. 1335 (1998); Patricia 1L Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L REV. 235
(1999).
102. Professors Cross and Tiller gave the word "whistleblower' prominence in describing
the behavior of politically heterogeneous panels of judges. See Cross & Tiller, Judicial Partisan-
ship, supra note 101, at 2159, 2175-76.
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The regression equations reported in Tables VII and VIII al-
ready contain some evidence that whistleblowers do not compel
publication. Neither the presence of a district court judge nor that
of an appellate judge visiting from another circuit increased the
likelihood that an opinion would be published. If judges feel pres-
sure to publish certain opinions in the presence of an "outsider,"
that pressure might materialize in the case of a judge who could
carry tales of their strategic publication decisions to other courts.
The failure of these variables to show a significant relationship
with publication decisions provides modestly persuasive evidence
against the whistleblower hypothesis in making publication deci-
sions.
We tested the homogeneity theory further by creating a se-
ries of variables depicting homogenous panels and substituting
those variables for the judicial characteristic variables in Table VII.
Thus, we substituted variables representing all-Republican and all-
Democratic panels for the variable counting the number of Demo-
crats on a panel. We replaced the variable designating the number
of women on each panel with one distinguishing all-male from
mixed-gender panels. 0 3 We similarly created variables for all-white
panels;10 4 panels composed exclusively of appellate judges from the
circuit deciding the case; l0 5 panels of all elite law school graduates;
panels with no graduates of elite law schools; panels with no former
NLRA management attorneys; 0 6 and panels with no judges who
had other types of NLRA experience. 07 To replace our variable for
103. Although several panels in our database included two female judges, none included
all female judges. Thus, we could not construct a variable reflecting all.female panels.
104. This variable was simply the opposite of the variable reflecting presence of a minority
judge. Because so few panels included two minority judges, the minority variable used for the
analyses in Tables VII and VIII distinguished panels with at least one minority judge from all
other panels. There were no panels composed exclusively of minority judges, so we could not
create a variable depicting that type of homogeneity.
105. Panels failing to meet this criterion were those including at least one district court
judge or at least one judge visiting from another circuit. There were no panels composed exclu.
sively of these "outsider" judges, so we could not create a variable representing that type of ho.
mogeneity.
106. Several panels included two former management attorneys, but none included three
judges with NLRA management experience. Thus, we could not create a variable reflecting pan.
els with homogeneous management experience.
107. Once again, there were no panels composed exclusively of judges with union, gov.
ernment, and/or academic NLRA experience, so we could not create a variable reflecting that
type of homogeneity.
In addition to the two NLRA variables described above, we created two other variables ro-
flecting panels with no type of NLRA experience (management, government, union, or academic)
and panels composed exclusively of judges with some type of NLRA experience. These homoge-
neity variables, however, never achieved significance in our equations.
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average judicial age, we created two dummy variables reflecting
panels with "young" or "old" average ages.108
Table IX reports the results of a regression equation substi-
tuting these homogeneity variables for the basic judicial character-
istic variables. 1 9 As the table shows, none of the homogeneity vari-
ables achieved significance at the conventional .05 level, and just
two approached significance. The two approaching significance,
moreover, reflect the effects already reported in Tables VII and VIII
rather than distinctive effects based on homogeneity. Thus, panels
composed exclusively of judges who had graduated from elite law
schools were more likely to publish their opinions than were other
panels. This, however, simply reflects the extreme instance of the
tendency we detected in Tables VII and VIII for a higher number of
elite law graduates to enhance the likelihood of publication. Simi-
larly, the tendency of panels lacking any judges with NLRA man-
agement experience to publish their opinions represents an extreme
instance of the lesson derived from Tables VII and VIII: a higher
number of judges with NLRA management experience decreases the
likelihood of publication.
108. To create these variables, we first ascertained that the full range of average panel
ages spanned more than thirty years, from 43 to 74.33 years. We defined panels falling within
the first ten years of this range as "young" panels, while panels falling in the oldest ten years
were "old" panels. It is possible that some of these panels were heterogeneous with respect to
age. A panel falling near the top of our "young" age range, for example, might have included two
very young judges and one more senior judge. Likewise, panels falling in the reference "mid-age
category could have been completely homogenous. Within the current constraints of our data-
base, however, this proved the best way to approximate homogeneous age panels.
109. We obtained similar results when we introduced the homogeneity variables one at a
time into the regression equation, substituting just one homogeneity variable for its counterpart
in the regression equation reflected in Table VII, while keeping the other variables in that equa-
tion constant.
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Table IX: Logistic Regression for Publication: Homogeneous Panels (N=1129.45)
Variable
Reversal
CA For Union
Dissent
Concurrence
8(a)(5) Issue
8(b) Issue
10(c) Issue
Procedural Issue
Successor Issue
Jurisdictional Issue
Multiple Issues
Year of Decision
All Republicans
All Democrats
All Men
All White
Young Panel
Old Panel
All In-Cir. Judges
All Elite Law Grads
No Elite Law Grads
No NLRA Mgt
No Nonmgt NLRA
D.C. Circuit
1st Circuit
2d Circuit
3d Circuit
4th Circuit
5th Circuit
7th Circuit
8th Circuit
9th Circuit
10th Circuit
11th Circuit
Constant
1 Pseudo R2
I Coefficient
2.6580 *
.3872
1.9061 *
2.4155 *
.9270 *
1.9713 *
-. 0305
1.0288 *
-1.3985 *
-. 4078
.3419
-. 0856
.4412
-. 6287
-. 4462
.0604
-. 4390
.2694
-. 1530
.5689 *
-. 5600
.5320 *
-. 5936
.3510
1.4314
.0201
-. 9046
-. 3719
.1181
3.2469 *
2.6136 *
.2037
.4174
1.0435
6.0202
,7-. 30 4 9 ***
*p <.10, **p .05, ***p .01
We recombined the homogeneity variables in Table IX in a
variety of ways, but could find no other significant associations be-
tween homogeneous panels and the likelihood of publication. Com-
bining the variables for all-Republican and all-Democratic panels
into a single variable reflecting panels composed exclusively of
judges from the same political party did not produce a significant
association with publication. Nor did combining the variables for
race and gender into a single variable distinguishing panels com-
posed exclusively of white male judges result in such a significant
106
I Robust Std. Error
.4626
.4329
.6467
1.4497
.2920
.5842
.3702
.5780
.7524
.5592
.2934
.0679
.3821
.5167
.3432
.3107
.4420
.3360
.3208
.3415
.5188
.2897
.3816
.5942
1.1743
.4897
.5739
.6944
.5556
.7847
.8788
.4780
.7794
.7140
6.0981
I Significance I
.000
.371
.003
.096
.001
.001
.934
.075
.063
.466
.244
.208
.248
.224
.193
.846
.321
.423
.633
.096
.280
.066
.120
.555
.223
.967
.115
.592
.832
.000
.003
.670
.592
.144
.324
1 .000
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association. 110 In the end, we found no evidence that homogeneity
affects the decision to publish an opinion.
F. Are Unpublished Opinions Routine?
The foregoing analyses all probed factors that might predict
the likelihood that an opinion would be published. In this final Sec-
tion, we explore a somewhat different empirical question: Are un-
published opinions themselves routine? Or is there any evidence
that those opinions contain controversial decisions?
Our analyses already contain some evidence that unpub-
lished opinions include controversy. As Table V reflects, courts de-
clined to publsh almost 15% of opinions carrying a dissent. Simi-
larly, they refrained from publishing 14.96% of reversals and 5.92%
of opinions with separate concurrences. Among the unpublished
opinions, 7.15% were reversals, 1.85% carried dissents, and 0.19%
included concurrences. In all, 8.44% of the unpublished opinions
signaled some disagreement, either among the judges on the panel
or between the court and the NLRB." l
We probe further the possibility of controversy by measuring
whether judicial characteristics-such as political party, gender,
college background, or pre-judicial experience-predict votes among
unpublished opinions. Our previous work demonstrates that these
judicial attributes help predict whether a judge will vote for the
union in all ULP cases. 112 Those associations suggest that labor law
decisions do not mechanically follow precedent or statutory lan-
guage; judges with different backgrounds and preferences some-
times interpret precedent or statutory language differently.
If unpublished opinions represent routine application of set-
tled law, however, then judicial characteristics should show little or
no relationship to outcome among those opinions. A Democrat, for
example, should be just as likely as a Republican to vote against
110. We also combined the variables for different types of NLRA experience, see supra
note 107, and broke apart the variable distinguishing panels with no judges sitting by designa-
tion into one variable designating panels with a visiting judge from another circuit, and a second
variable reflecting panels with a district judge sitting by designation. None of these attempts
yielded a significant association with publication rates.
111. The disagreement rate we found among unpublished opinions is somewhat similar to
rates described by other scholars. Songer, for example, found that 5.9% of unpublished opinions
in the Fourth Circuit during 1986 were reversals; 12.0% of those in the Eleventh Circuit were
reversals; and 12.4% in the D.C. Circuit were reversals. Songer, supra note 6, at 311. Just 0.3%
of the unpublished opinions in all three circuits included dissents. See id.
112. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1718 thL H, 1737-59 (explaining
results).
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the union in an unpublished opinion if that opinion truly represents
the straightforward application of existing law.113 Indeed, several
federal appellate judges recently have suggested that analysis of
unpublished decisions would yield just such a result. 114
We thus returned to a larger database recording all judicial
votes on ULP issues to analyze whether the subset of unpublished
opinions reflected any significant associations between judicial
characteristics and judicial outcome. 115 We could not simply perform
a regression analysis within the subset of unpublished decisions,
because analyses in the previous sections show that judicial charac-
teristics affect publication decisions. Limiting our analysis to un-
published opinions thus would introduce an unacceptable risk of
selection bias. 116
We solved this problem by using a probit model with sample
selection. 117 This model first uses one set of variables to predict an
opinion's unpublished status, and then a second set of overlapping,
but not identical, variables to predict judicial votes in unpublished
opinions. Information from the first equation is used to correct for
sample selection in the second equation.
Table X reports the results of a regression for judicial votes
supporting the union; the regression is limited to the population of
unpublished cases, after correcting for selection bias. 118 As the table
113. See Songer, supra note 6, at 310 '[Making the formal criteria [for publication] at face
value leads to the prediction that there will be no partisan or presidential appointment effects
observable in the unpublished decisions of any of the circuits examined."). Songer used a similar
technique to analyze unpublished opinions in his pathbreaking 1990 study, but he limited his
investigation to bivariate analyses and did not attempt to correct for selection bias. See id. at
312-13.
114. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 101, at 1343; Wald, supra note 101, at 246.
115. For a detailed discussion of this database, see Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra
note 11, at 1694-1708.
116. For further discussion of selection bias and the problems it presents for social science
analyses, see generally Richard A. Berk, An Introduction to Sample Selection Bias in Sociological
Data, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 386 (1983); Christopher Winship & Robert D. Mare, Models for Sample
Selection Bias, 18 ANN. REV. Soc. 327 (1992).
117. We used the "heckprob" command within STATA Version 6. See 2 STATA
REFERENCE MANUAL RELEASE 6, at 29-37 (1999).
118. In the selection equation, we used eight variables that were significant or approached
significance in our direct analyses of publication (reversal, presence of a dissent, section 8(a)(5)
issue, section 8(b) issue, year of decision, judge's age, judge's graduation from an elite law school,
and judicial experience representing management in NLRA cases), as well as two variables
(presence of a district court judge and presence of a concurrence) that came close to achieving
significance and, we hypothesized, might have some previously undetected relationship to publi.
cation. After running the analysis, we added to the selection equation several variables that were
significant in our primary prediction of judicial outcome (Democrat, year appointed, female, a
female/Democrat interaction, Latino/Asian, prior elective office, nonelective office, prior judicial
experience, and experience as a full-time academic). We added these variables to insure that
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reflects, five different judicial attributes show a significant associa-
tion with votes even among unpublished opinions. Democratic
judges were significantly more likely than their Republican col-
leagues to support the union in these unpublished cases.119 Judges
who had held elected office or served as full-time academics were
also more likely to vote for the union. Conversely, judges with prior
judicial experience, as well as Latino and Asian judges, were sig-
nificantly less likely to support the union. 120
effects reflected in the main equation did not stem from selection bias. Indeed, coefficients for
several of these variables lost significance after we corrected for that bias.
In our final equation, Rho (the sample selection statistic) was -.8283 (p = .000). indicating the
presence of significant selection bias. Variables that showed a sigmficant association with non-
publication were reversal, dissent, or concurrence, the genderlDemocrat interaction, nonelective
office, judicial experience, 8(a)(5) issues, 8(b) issues, graduation from an elite law school, and
NLRA management experience. This list differs somewhat from the variables we report as sig-
nificant in Table VII, because it is based on an analysis of individual judicial votes on separate
issues, rather than on analysis of cases. The latter analysis is more appropriate for isolating
factors that predict publication, because cases are published in their entirety by panels, rather
than by individual judges or individual issues. For the purpose of creating a selection equation,
however, we had to analyze publication by judge and issue.
119. Songer likewise found a statistically significant relationship between political party
and liberal outcomes in a database of unpublished opinions, although he relied exclusively upon
bivariate analyses. See Songer, supra note 6, at 312. See generally Donald 1. Songer, Consensual
and Nonconsensual Decisions in Unanimous Opinions of the United States Courts of Appeals, 26
AM. J. POL. SCl. 225 (1982) (identifying ideological differences in cases disposed of unanimously
by courts of appeals).
120. The significance of our coefficient for Asian and Latino judges should be interpreted
with caution, because very few of those judges appeared in our database. Brudney, Schiavoni, &
Merritt, supra note 11, at 1703 n.103.
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Table XY Logistic Regression for Votes Favoring the Union in Unpublished
Decisions (N=2,525)
1 Variable 1! Coefficient
Democrat .3967 *
Year Appointed .0138
Age - .0024
Female .2226
Female/Dem. Int. - .4800
Black 
-.2249
Latino/Asian - 1.0371 *
Catholic or Jewish - .0905
College Selectivity - .0080
Elite Law School - .0977
Elected Office .2901 **
Nonelective Position - .1307
Judicial Experience - .3116 ***
Full-Time Academic .5438 ***
Corporate Law Exp. .0844
Workplace Law Exp. - .0628
NLRA Management .1854
Board Outcome 1.9500 ***
8(a)(5) Issue .0899
Other 8(a) Issue - .6775 ***
8(b) Issue - .9396
10(c) Issue - .3575
D.C. Circuit .0370
1st Circuit 3.4990 *
2d Circuit 1.3600 ***
3d Circuit .5719 ***
4th Circuit - .5574 ***
5th Circuit - .2032
7th Circuit -. 1645
8th Circuit - .1494
9th Circuit .2430
10th Circuit 3.2813 *
l1th Circuit 3.4671 ***
Year of Decision - .0778 ***
Constant 6.5803 *
1 Model Chi2 430.95&W*
Robust Std. E
.1361
.0098
.0074
.2689
.3384
.2652
.2771
.1076
.0054
.1096
.1199
.1167
.1118
.1350
.1358
.1511
.1784
.1850
.0948
.2275
.3128
.1173
.1644
.2148
.2164
.1641
.1467
.1931
.2261
.2887
.1665
.1281
.1695
.0209
1.8502
*p <.10, **p .05, ***p .01
These significant relationships strongly suggest that resolu-
tion of unpublished cases is not as straightforward as some judges
maintain. If these opinions represent uncontroversial applications
of the law to new fact patterns, why do judges with different back-
grounds and demographic characteristics reach different results?
We address that question further in the next Section.
In addition to the five judicial background characteristics
approaching or reaching significance in this equation, the coeffi-
rror Significance
.004
.160
.751
.408
.156
.396
.000
.400
.138
.373
.015
.263
.005
.000
.543
.678
.298
.000
.343
.003
.003
.002
.822
.000
.000
.000
.000
.293
.467
.605
.144
.000
.000
.000
.000
0oo6
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cient for year of decision is negative and strongly significant. More
recent unpublished decisions, in other words, were more likely to
reject union claims than older decisions. This relationship could
reflect doctrine that became progressively less sympathetic to union
positions, but we did not detect such a relationship in our analysis
of all judicial votes in both published and unpublished opinions. 121
The emergence of this relationship solely among unpublished cases,
and over a relatively short period, again suggests that the opinions
may represent more discretionary application of legal principles
than the publication rules contemplate.
IV. DISCUSSION
Our analysis of publication decisions and unpublished opin-
ions yields results that are in some respects reassuring and in oth-
ers more worrisome. We address the contrasting implications of our
findings in the discussion that follows. In a final Section, we con-
sider the relationship of these findings to the Eighth Circuit's re-
cent decision holding that the Constitution requires Article III
courts to give precedential weight to all of their decisions.122
A. Support for Limited Publication Rules
We uncovered several indicia that existing publication plans
function reasonably well. Formal publication criteria, such as a de-
cision to reverse or the presence of a dissent, play a large role in
predicting publication. In addition, circuits that formally encour-
aged publication of reversals published more decisions, on average,
than other circuits.
It is also reassuring that different statutory sections helped
predict publication. Courts were more likely to publish opinions
disposing of section 8(a)(5) bargaining claims, as well as cases re-
viewing section 8(b) allegations against unions, than they were to
publish cases dealing exclusively with the bread-and-butter claims
of intimidation or discrimination against individual employees that
arise under sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRAL The latter claims,
which involve assertions of individual rights analogous to claims in
other areas of public law, may seem more familiar to judges than
121. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1715 tbL II. We also found no
such relationship when analyzing published judicial votes on their own. See id. at 1732 tbLVII.
122. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000); see also supra notes 8-9
and accompanying text (discussing Anastasoff).
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allegations of bad faith bargaining under section 8(a)(5) or union
misconduct under section 8(b), which raise relatively unusual ques-
tions about the protected nature of group action. 123 Decisions to
publish more cases discussing the latter issues, therefore, track the
intent of circuit plans to limit publication to cases that "add to the
body of law."1 24
Similarly, we found a significant association between the
number of ULP cases decided by a circuit and the likelihood that an
opinion rendered in that circuit would be published. After control-
ling for other variables, circuits that decided a greater number of
ULP cases published a smaller fraction of those cases. As one would
expect, the marginal precedential value of each case was smaller in
circuits that decided a large number of such cases.
We found no evidence of any whistleblower effects in publi-
cation decisions. Homogeneous panels were just as likely to publish
their opinions as heterogeneous ones. Political party affiliation,
moreover, played no role in selecting cases for publication. Nor did
a host of other judicial attributes affect the likelihood that an opin-
ion would be published. We thus found few traces of partisan poli-
tics or strategic behavior in choosing cases for publication.
The only personal characteristics showing a significant link
with publication-judicial age, graduation from an elite law school,
and NLRA management experience-most likely stemmed from
neutral publication preferences rather than strategic conduct. In-
deed, if we are correct that the association between management
experience and restrained publication stems from expertise, then
the association further confirms the rational working of limited
publication plans. The judges with most experience interpreting the
NLRA were least likely to publish adjudications under the Act, sug-
gesting that they recognized routine or redundant decisions.
B. Warning Signals
Notwithstanding the reassuring results discussed above, we
uncovered evidence that raises troubling questions about limited
publication rules. Like other scholars, we identified substantial dif-
ferences in publication rates among the circuits. This variation
arose in a relatively compact area of law and even after we con-
trolled for caseload and numerous other factors. Judges from differ-
123. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1726-27.
124. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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ent circuits apply relatively similar publication criteria to arrive at
widely different publication rates. This lack of uniformity suggests
that judges do not make consistent publication decisions. l2
Intercircuit variation also means that some circuits shape
precedent more than others. High publication rates in the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits, even after controlling for factors like reversals
and dissents, may mean that those circuits exert greater influence
on the development of the law governing unfair labor practices.1 6
This phenomenon raises particular concern under a nationwide
statute like the NLRA, in which each party has considerable discre-
tion to choose the venue for appeal of a Board decision.12 Indeed,
the Board and other repeat players in the NLRA litigation arena
may decide to factor in the publication records of particular circuits
when selecting their appellate forum, if they have not already done
SO.
Second, we found a surprising number of reversals, dissents,
and concurrences among unpublished opinions. About one in four-
teen unpublished opinions (7.15%) reversed the NLRB, while 2.04%
included a concurrence or dissent. Some of those reversals and split
opinions may have marked only minor disagreements with the
Board or among panel members; we coded cases as reversed or split
if the court reversed the Board on any issue or if a panel member
wrote a separate opinion on any matter. Still, several scholars have
argued that courts should publish all, or virtually all, reversals and
split opinions. According to critics, these decisions "are, by defini-
tion, controversial" because they mark disagreement among learned
judges and/or agency members. 12 Concurrences and dissents may
125. Judges have expressed the belief that "it (is] probable that a like case would usually
be published, or not published, similarly in all circuits" Nichols, supra note 5, at 922. The dis-
parity in circuit publication rates, especially after controlling for factors like reversals and dis-
sents, casts doubt on this assertion.
126. Cf Gulati & McCaulif supra note 4, at 191-92 (noting that intercircuit differences in
the use of judgment orders can create differences in influence). Gulati and McCauliff go so far as
to argue that, given intercircuit differences in publication rates, "a President making a nomina-
tion to a Court of Appeals should realize that appointing someone to the Seventh Circuit, which
has a high rate of publication, will have a significantly different impact than appointing the
same person to the Third Circuit." Id. at 205.
127. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1994) (allowing persons aggrieved by a Board order to obtain
review in the circuit where the unfair labor practice allegedly occurred, where the aggrieved
person resides or transacts business, or in the D.C. Circuit); i. § 160(e) (allowving the Board to
seek enforcement of its order in the circuit where an unfair labor practice occurred, or where the
person that committed the ULP resides or transacts business).
128. Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform, supra note 6, at 612 (discussing split opin-
ions); see also id. at 618 (discussing reversals); Songer, supra note 6, at 309-10 CU([]t should be
expected that virtually all of the unpublished decisions will be unanimous affirmances of the
case below. If the case involves.., the straightforward application of clear and well settled
2001]
VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW [Vol. 54:1:71
also "serve to restrain judicial advocacy,"'129 while reversals illumi-
nate misunderstandings or misperceptions by agencies or district
courts-or even ongoing substantive disagreement between those
decision-makers and the courts of appeals. 180 Nonpublication of re-
versals, concurrences, or dissents above a de minimis level com-
promises all of these functions.
Third, we noted that circuit rules permitting citation of un-
published opinions were associated with lower publication rates.
This relationship is not necessarily worrisome; it may signal a ra-
tional belief that if unpublished opinions are citable, there is less
harm in leaving a decision unpublished. The relationship, however,
may constitute an unforeseen effect of more lenient citation rules in
some circuits. Courts contemplating a change in their citation rules
will have to weigh the possibility that citation practices affect pub-
lication rates. Similarly, if other courts of appeals-or the Supreme
Court-agree with the Eighth Circuit that the Constitution accords
precedential effect to all unpublished opinions, the percentage of
opinions that are published may fall in circuits that currently forbid
citation of unpublished opinions.''
Fourth, we discovered that three judicial characteristics
were significantly associated with publication rates: older panels
and those with a greater number of elite law school graduates pub-
lished a higher number of their opinions, while panels with more
precedent..., then the correct decision and the correct basis of decision should be obvious to any
person who is well trained in the law.").
129. Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform, supra note 6, at 612.
130. See id., at 618-19.
131. See Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900, 905 (8th Cir. 2000). The relation-
ship, of course, does not necessarily carry this causal direction. It is possible that the circuits
currently allowing citation of unpublished opinions adopted those rules precisely because they
maintained a high percentage of unpublished opinions. The high rate of unpublished opinions
could derive from other factors, while the citation rule responded to and reinforced that situa-
tion.
We identified two other curious relationships between publication rates and circuit rules gov.
erning publication. Circuits that encouraged publication of opinions carrying dissents or concur-
rences published a smaller percentage of their opinions than did circuits lacking that formal
encouragement in their rules. After we controlled for other factors, we also found that circuits
explicitly requiring majority approval to publish an opinion published more decisions, on aver-
age, than did other circuits.
These relationships, again, do not mean that limited publication plans are malfunctioning-
or even that the rules cause these fluctuations in publication rate. The rules may respond to
publication practices already entrenched within each circuit. A circuit with low publication
rates, for example, may adopt a rule encouraging publication of split opinions because of concern
that too many of those decisions are unpublished. The relationships, however, provide further
evidence that practices beyond formal rules affect publication rates. Regardless of whether any
of these associations are causal or merely reinforcing, limited publication rules may well have
unexpected effects.
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former management lawyers published a lower percentage. As
noted earlier, the last of these relationships could represent strate-
gic behavior. Former management attorneys were significantly less
likely than their colleagues to publish opinions favoring the union-
precisely those precedents that would have harmed their former
clients. We believe this relationship arises instead from the man-
agement attorneys' greater expertise under the NLRA, and their
consequent ability to identify more decisions as routine,13 2 but the
possibility of strategic behavior remains.
Even if not strategic, the publication behavior affects the
composition of precedential law. Ironically, the body of published
ULP opinions contains proportionately fewer cases decided by the
judges most familiar with the field. If expertise discourages publi-
cation in the manner we have suggested, and if the same tendencies
occur in other fields, an unanticipated effect of limited publication
plans would be a subtle bias toward published opinions by panels
with less sophistication in the subject under review. 133
All of the aforementioned effects have important implica-
tions for social scientists who study judicial decision-making. As
other scholars have warned, the large percentage of unpublished
opinions counsels against research based exclusively on published
decisions.134 This is especially true if any of the factors under inves-
tigation plays a role in selecting cases for publication. 13 5 Our own
work shows that the tendency of elite law school graduates to pub-
lish significantly more ULP opinions than their colleagues, com-
bined with the fact that opinions rated borderline for publication
are likely to be pro-union affirmances, would lead a researcher
132. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
133. Professors Gulati and McCauliff suggest an opposite scenario, that panels lacking
expertise in a complex area-such as securities regulation-might avoid deciding difficult issues
of first impression by issuing a summary affirmance. See Gulati & McCauli, supra note 4, at
176, 189-90. We found no evidence of this syndrome among ULP cases. On the contrary, as ex-
plained in text, less expert panels were more likely to publish than expert ones.
In contrast to the relative scarcity of published ULP opinions joined by former management
attorneys, panels of older judges and elite law graduates contribute a disproportionately high
fraction of those opinions. That skew may not worry policymakers, but it signals yet again that
limited publication has unintended consequences.
134. See e.g., Peter Siegelman & John J. Donahue mH, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A
Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAw & SOctY
REV. 1133, 1136-37, 1165-66 (1990); Songer, supra note 6, at 307.
135. See also Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 134, at 1145. Siegelman and Donohue
quote Sir Arthur Eddington's wonderful words illuminating this subject: alf you catch fish with
a net having a 6-inch mesh, you are liable to formulate the hypothesis that all fish are more than
6 inches in length." Id. at 1145 n.30. If judicial attributes systematically affect the selection of
cases for publication, then studying published cases will yield a biased view of those attributes
and their relationship to outcomes.
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analyzing only published opinions to the erroneous conclusion that
graduates of elite law schools favor the union in their ULP votes. 13 6
Similarly, a focus on published opinions would lead that researcher
to overlook a significant association between age and anti-union
votes. 137 Today, a scholar who studies only published opinions from
the United States Courts of Appeals does so at his or her peril.
Finally, and most notably, we found evidence that five judi-
cial characteristics predicted votes even among unpublished opin-
ions. Judges appointed by Democratic Presidents, those who had
held elected office, and those who had served as full-time academics
were significantly more likely than other judges to support the un-
ion in these cases. Judges who had served on another court, as well
as Latino or Asian judges, were significantly less likely to vote for
the union in unpublished cases.
These findings suggest that unpublished opinions may not be
as routine as advocates of limited publication believe. On the con-
trary, partisan and attitudinal differences emerge even among
these cases. The differences, in turn, may signal important dissen-
sion over points of law. It is possible that, contrary to the intent of
limited publication plans, some unpublished opinions create new
law and that judges disagree over the direction of those legal prin-
ciples.
It is also possible, however, that most unpublished opinions
do apply settled law to the facts, but that judges differ in the way
they apply that law. A Democratic judge may "see" a retaliatory
motive behind an employer's disciplinary action, leading to a pro-
union vote in a ULP case, while a Republican judge does not see
such a motive on the same facts. A judge who has held elected office
may be more sensitive than other judges to conduct tainting elec-
tions; she may perceive a chill on freedom of employee choice when
other judges fail to do so. Unpublished opinions thus could "decide
particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law,"'13
while still reflecting substantial disagreement among judges about
how those principles should apply.
Panel unanimity in most unpublished opinions does not ne-
gate this possibility. Cases are most likely to appear routine when
the law is clear and all three judges agree on the application of that
136. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1733-35, 1751.52.
137. See id. at 1754 n.238. This occurs because the older judge's tendency to reject union
claims, apparent in an analysis of all published and unpublished decisions, is masked by the
older judge's tendency to publish more routine pro-union affirmances.
138. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1 (1993).
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law to the facts. Yet our examination of unpublished cases suggests
that some unanimous panels apply the law in ways that favor the
union while others apply it in ways that support the employer.
Analyzing a large number of cases, as we did, can reveal such ten-
dencies.
These findings raise important policy issues about limited
publication. Even if unpublished opinions articulate no new princi-
ples, do differences in applying settled law to the facts merit more
public attention? One could argue that these differences are inevi-
table as judges apply nuanced standards in complex factual set-
tings, that a sufficient number of these differences already appear
among published cases, and that it is unnecessary to inflate the
body of published precedent with further examples of subtle varia-
tion in the way judges apply existing principles to the facts.
On the other hand, law consists largely of applying estab-
lished principles to new facts. This is especially true under a ma-
ture statute like the NLRA, where many rules of law are well set-
tled. If judges vary in predictable ways as they apply settled princi-
ples, litigants might benefit from being able to trace-and cite-
those variations. More broadly, federal court scholars and the
general public might deserve to know the extent to which judges
differ in their application of existing law. Our findings raise
questions about unpublished opinions that seem thus far to have
escaped attention. 139
In this connection, it is especially troubling that the coeffi-
cient for year of decision was negative and strongly significant in
our regression among unpublished cases. This variable did not
achieve significance in our previous analyses of all ULP cases. 140 It
appears, therefore, that unpublished ULP decisions increasingly
rejected union claims between 1987 and 1993, while published
opinions showed no such tendency. Litigants who relied exclusively
on published opinions, therefore, may have received inaccurate sig-
nals about judicial trends. Even if the courts did not articulate new
pro-employer principles during that period, they may have applied
139. Donald Songer captured the view of most policyrna-ers when he declared in 1990
that "[t]here is little controversy over the abstract notion that cases with no precedential value,
no significance for public policy, and in which the existence of clear precedents give judges no
discretion in decisionmaking should not be published." Songer, supra note 6, at 309. Songer and
others seem not to have contemplated the possibility that even "clear precedents might give
judges some discretion in applying those principles.
140. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 11, at 1715 (Table I); see also id. at
1732 (Table VII) (reporting no significance for year of decision with regard to ULP issues among
published cases).
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existing law in a way that increasingly favored employers. The cir-
cuits' limited publication practices would have masked that trend.
In sum, we identified numerous warning signals about the
operation of limited publication plans. All of our findings, of course,
are limited to unfair labor practice claims arising under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Different relationships might emerge if
we studied other fields of law. When exploring publication deci-
sions, however, it is important to focus on relatively discrete legal
areas. Otherwise, variation among fields-with some subjects gen-
erating high rates of publication and others producing few pub-
lished decisions-could conceal important relationships. Further,
the trends we uncovered are unlikely to affect only NLRA decisions.
Table I confirms that the circuits vary dramatically, not only in the
percentage of ULP cases they publish, but in their overall percent-
ages of published decisions. Publication rates among the circuits for
ULP decisions correlate strongly with overall circuit-by-circuit
publication rates.' 4 ' Other results we uncovered in our analyses-
such as the presence of partisan differences among unpublished
decisions-are likely to occur in fields outside labor law as well.
C. Should Unpublished Opinions Be Precedential?
The Eighth Circuit recently sent shock waves through the
legal community by ruling that Article III of the Constitution re-
quires the federal courts to accord precedential status to unpub-
lished opinions. 142 The court's opinion-authored by Judge Richard
Arnold-has triggered a constitutional debate that may be resolved
by the Supreme Court.143 The outcome of that controversy will de-
pend upon constitutional principles, especially the meaning of the
phrase "judicial Power" in Article III of the Constitution. 4 4 The
141. See supra text following note 61.
142. See Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900, 905 (8th Cir. 2000); see also supra
notes 8-9 and accompanying text (discussing Anastasoff).
143. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Stealth Decisions Under Fire, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 4, 2000, at 1
C'[The decision was the talk of the appellate world within hours. The next day, it dominated
hallway discussions at the 9th Circuit Judicial Conference in Idaho. Academics traded around
the decision-and reactions to it-in online chats for days."); see id. at 6 CEn banc treatment or a
grant of cert [by the Supreme Court] seem fairly likely, especially in light of the enormous practi-
cal consequences of what Arnold has done.") (quoting Harvard Law School Professor Laurence
Tribe). As of November 21, 2000, when this Article went to press, a petition for rehearing on
banc was pending before the Eighth Circuit but had not yet been resolved.
144. The Eighth Circuit stressed that Article III vests only "judicial Power" in the federal
courts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1; Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899. The court reasoned that this
power-to determine what the law is through case-by-case decision-making-necessarily oem-
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findings we present here do not determine that constitutional issue,
but some of them offer valuable background.
In particular, we found that the unpublished opinions we
studied included a surprising number of reversals, dissents, and
concurrences. Even more important, we discovered that outcomes
among unpublished opinions showed significant associations with
political party affiliation, specific professional experiences, and
other characteristics of judges adjudicating the cases. Together,
these findings suggest that panels authoring unpublished opinions
reach some results with which other reasonable judges would dis-
agree. Such divergent views are likely to reflect both differences as
to the meaning of legal principles and disagreement over the proper
application of seemingly settled law. Under those circumstances,
failing to give unpublished opinions precedential effect raises the
very specter described by the Eighth Circuit: that like cases will be
decided in unlike ways, that judges' decisions will be "regulated
only by their own [personal] opinions,"145 and that legal principles
will evolve, not "in response to the dictates of reason," but "because
judges have simply changed their minds."146 Although courts may
decide that maintaining a body of unpublished opinions is a practi-
cal necessity, our findings lend weight to the Eighth Circuit's con-
cern that these decisions should carry the same precedential effect
as other opinions.
In addition, our research confirms that circuits vary widely
in the percentage of opinions they publish, even when analysis is
limited to decisions arising under a single statute and when we con-
trol for separate factors that might affect publication (such as the
presence of a reversal). Individual judges also seem to vary in their
tendency to publish opinions after controlling for other factors. In
our study, older judges and graduates of elite law schools showed a
higher tendency to publish while judges who had represented man-
agement on NLRA matters were less inclined to publish their
NLRA decisions. If unpublished opinions lack precedential value,
then these patterns distort-probably unwittingly-the composition
of opinions binding future decisions. Some circuits, and some
judges, will determine the direction of authoritative case law more
than others.
braces the doctrine of precedent, and that any attempt by an Article I court "to avoid the prece-
dential effect of [its] prior decisions" is an unwarranted expansion of its power as a court. Id. at
900.
145. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *259 (1765)).
146. Id. at 905.
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In concluding that the Constitution requires Article III
courts to give all decisions precedential effect, the Eighth Circuit
invoked Justice Story's warning that "[a] more alarming doctrine
could not be promulgated by any American court, than that it was
at liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions, and to decide
for itself, without reference to the settled course of antecedent prin-
ciples." 147 Rules restricting the citation of unpublished opinions are
not that arbitrary; they do not allow a court to look back at the ac-
cumulated body of decisions and decide for itself which ones to
honor. Instead, limited citation rules have a prospective effect; they
allow a panel to decide whether the case before it will bind judges
in future cases. Courts will have to determine whether this practice
is as worrisome as one allowing a court to "disregard all former
rules and decisions" and, whatever that answer, whether the prac-
tice exceeds the "judicial Power" conferred by the Constitution.
Our research shows that publication decisions, when com-
bined with limited-citation rules, do affect the substance of prece-
dential law. Unpublished decisions do not reflect routine applica-
tions of existing law with which all judges would agree. If they did,
these decisions would not include a noticeable number of reversals,
dissents, or concurrences, nor would they show significant associa-
tions between case outcome and judicial characteristics. Likewise,
individual courts and judges do not exhibit uniform tendencies to
publish their opinions. Even after controlling for important case
characteristics, some judges and courts are more likely to authorize
publication than others. If these 'Judges and courts also differ on
their substantive results, as much research suggests, then the
shape of precedent will be affected by seemingly neutral publication
decisions. 1
Our findings thus yield troubling public policy implications
that make the constitutional issue posed by the Eighth Circuit more
stark. We know that at least some unpublished decisions reach re-
sults with which other judges would disagree, and that judges and
courts also vary in their tendency to publish outcomes. It follows
that denying precedential value to unpublished opinions gives
147. Id. at 904 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, CONMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 377-78 (1833)).
148. As explained above, this pattern does not mean that judges or courts make strategic
decisions to manipulate precedent by publishing more or less of their opinions. Instead, judges
and courts may genuinely hold different attitudes toward the importance of publication. If those
attitudes correlate with attitudes on judicial outcomes, however, then apparently neutral publi-
cation decisions will affect the direction of published precedents.
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judges discretion to decide which of their rulings will bind future
decision-makers-and sets the stage for inconsistent treatment of
like cases. Whether such a denial is consistent with the principle of
"judicial Power" embedded in the Constitution awaits a definitive
answer.
CONCLUSION
More than 25 years after the adoption of limited publication
plans in the federal courts of appeals, controversy continues over
the impact of those plans. For today's courts, some such plans seem
essential. Without an increase in the number of sitting judges or a
reduction in the courts' caseload, it is unimaginable that the courts
could publish detailed deliberative opinions in every case they de-
cide. 149 The tension between limited publication and a tradition of
precedential decision-making, however, warrants ongoing examina-
tion of publication decisions.150
Our investigation, using sophisticated empirical techniques,
yields both reassurance and concern. The absence of strategic be-
havior, partisan publication decisions, or whistleblower effects sug-
gests that panels generally pursue neutral criteria when deciding
which opinions to publish. On the other hand, the substantial
variation in publication rates among circuits resolving comparable
claims under a single statute suggests that judges implement those
criteria quite differently. The evidence of partisan disagreement
among unpublished decisions, moreover, raises intriguing questions
about the role of judicial attitudes in applying settled precedents.
Applying law, like shaping it, requires judgment; judgment
implies discretion. Jurists and scholars have skirted the fact that
many unpublished opinions, even those announcing no new princi-
ples of law, embody discretion. We should not expect mechanical
justice from appellate judges, and it is unlikely that they perform
rote duties in 80% of the cases they resolve. Exploring the role of
discretion in unpublished opinions, as we have done here, can in-
form the administration of limited publication plans. That inquiry
also expands our understanding of the ways in which appellate de-
cision-making interweaves fact, principle, and discretion.
149. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM.t (1996);
Richman & Reynolds, supra note 34; Wald, supra note 2, at 1373-77.
150. Wald, supra note 2, at 1376 (advocating "periodic overviews" of limited publication
plans to assure that "arbitrary factors" do not "skew the system").
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